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Executive Summary 
 
In their recent report for the DTI on UK competitiveness, Porter and Ketels (2003) note “there 
is little systematic evidence on the impact of the UK financial market on UK companies’ strategy 
and investment choices.” This literature review and the follow-up case study research (published 
separately) were commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to study the 
impact of the UK financial system on UK management practice, including strategy and 
investment in human capital.  
 
Investor behaviour and the relations between investors and management practice have acquired 
new significance because of the increased concentration of ownership, enforcement of higher 
standards of financial responsibility, and investors’ grievances about some aspects of 
management practices. Current literature studies such developments under the heading of 
shareholder activism, involving different types of investors, including private trusts, private equity 
investors and institutional investors (section 1). 
 
Investor activism is the use of power by an investor to influence the management processes or 
outcomes of a given portfolio company. Such interactions can be described as an engagement 
process. Issues in investor activism and engagement processes are generally addressed within a 
principal-agent framework, in which the owner is viewed as the principal and the firm’s managers 
are the agent. However, the traditional ‘arms-length’ approach favoured by the conventional 
finance model is over-simplified, relying mainly on the threat of ‘exit’ and executive incentive 
contracts as means of aligning the interests of owners and managers. Other governance tools are 
necessary for the efficient reduction of agency costs and risks. Investors can reduce problems of 
information asymmetry between managers and themselves by directly engaging with the company. 
Engagement therefore is a means of matching investor expectations and actual company practice 
(section 1.1). 
 
Institutional share ownership is much more concentrated in the UK than in other leading 
economies, encouraging much closer ties between leading investors and corporate management. 
In the UK, more than three-quarters (76.5 per cent) of UK stock market capitalization was held 
by institutional investors. In the US, institutional investors owned 47.4 per cent of outstanding 
equity (section 1.2). Empirical studies into the effectiveness of investor activism do not provide a 
clear picture of the extent of investor activism, although case studies of CalPERS and Hermes 
provide examples of successful investor engagement. A study of CII (Council for Institutional 
 -4-
Investors) in the US found that targeted companies demonstrated share price increases of 11.6 
per cent more than untargeted companies (section 1.3). 
 
With the dramatic growth in the private equity market since the early 1990s, private equity funds 
exercise control over the management of portfolio companies by several means, including 
making funds available in stages, with the availability of additional funding being contingent on 
company performance or other factors (section 1.4.1). 
 
The likelihood of engagement is determined by a number of factors such as fund size, investment 
time horizon, performance expectations, the proportion of funds invested in equity, legal 
restraints, active/passive investing and internal/external management (section 2). Pension funds 
and private equity firms have the highest propensity for engagement (section 2.1; 2.6). 
 
Investors engage with companies in a variety of ways. The process can be described as a ‘ladder 
of escalation’, ranging from initial contact by telephone to extensive dialogue and negotiation at 
later stages (section 3). The threat of ‘going public’ or the use of proxy voting can be employed 
by investors at various stages of the engagement process (section 3.1; 3.2; 3.3).  Collaboration 
between investors can increase the leverage over company management; however, the usual 
problems of ‘free-riding’ (securing benefits without contributing to costs) may weaken the 
incentive to collaborate (section 3.5). This may be partially mitigated by recent developments in 
Internet communications.  
 
Investors influence management practice in a number of areas.  However, investors do not 
interfere with the day-to-day operations of the business. The areas of influence include: 
 
(i) Time Horizon: Because pension funds, both private and public, have significantly 
predictable, long-term outflows to beneficiaries, they will have a long-term 
perspective regarding their investments. As a result, they are likely to mitigate the 
short-term focus of managers (section 4.1). 
(ii) Investment in Intangibles: Investors with a long-term outlook facilitate proactive 
management approaches towards investments that create brand value, increase the 
customer base, enhance a firm’s information technology, or improve product and 
process design (section 4.2). 
(iii) Economic Uncertainties: The ‘universal owners’ of Hawley and Williams (2000) tend to 
have holdings in a broad cross-section of the economy. Since these owners (e.g. large 
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pension funds) are mainly interested in long-term enhanced returns for shareholders, 
they encourage managers to take a wider view of the economy (section 4.3). 
(iv) Innovation in Product Markets: It is suggested that liquid equity markets may be 
conducive to radical product innovations by facilitating the flotation of high-growth 
firms, as in the information technology and bio-medical industries, but less effective 
in fostering incremental innovation. However, recent developments in private equity 
finance and long-term shareholding by major financial institutions in the UK and 
USA may shift the balance towards incremental innovation in production processes - 
a hallmark of Japanese and German capital markets and companies (section 4.4). 
(v) Performance Expectations: Organisational processes such as quality and customer service 
have acquired a new significance in companies’ plans to secure and maintain 
competitive advantage. Activist investors therefore focus on both financial and non-
financial performance in targeted companies (section 4.5). 
(vi) Strategic orientation: Investors’ direct role in strategic decision making processes is most 
visible during periods of takeover bids and enterprise restructuring and consolidation 
(section 4.6.1; 4.6.2). Investors can help companies make important strategic trade-
offs.  Investors involved in governance are likely to encourage a trusting relationship 
between the company and its suppliers (section 4.6.3). 
(vii) Corporate Leadership: Investors exercise influence in matters of executive compensation 
through their representation in the membership and functioning of corporate boards. 
They are likely to encourage the selection of CEOs whose personal characteristics are 
suitable for the business (section 4.7); and to advocate performance-based pay, 
including some ‘option’ component (section 4.7.2).  
(viii) Flexible Management Approaches[dislike this phrase - meaning unclear even in context of 4.8]: 
The impact of investor behaviour upon the wages and salaries of lower level 
employees is indirect, through concern with controlling labour costs. Investors may 
encourage the adoption of flexible working arrangements, a mechanism through 
which labour costs can be significantly reduced (section 4.8). 
(ix) Employee Skill - Development and Utilization Strategies:  The greater role of investors in 
governance is positively linked with an employee-skill based company development 
strategy aimed at securing competitive advantage (section 4.9). A combination of 
higher wages, focused training programmes, and long-term employment contracts 
develops complementary core skills. 
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Data on publicly-traded UK firms were used to investigate whether financing choices differ 
systematically with R&D intensity (section 5). A non-linear relationship with the debt/assets 
ratio was found.  Firms that report positive but low R&D use more debt finance than firms that 
report no R&D, but the use of debt finance falls with R&D intensity among those firms that 
report R&D. Second, firms that report R&D are more likely to raise funds by issuing shares 
than firms that report no R&D, and this probability increases with R&D intensity. These 
findings support the view that well-functioning equity markets, including private equity 
finance, encourage firms’ activities in innovation and research and development (section 5.3). 
 
Company managers may also influence investors in their investment strategy. Keeping investors 
informed through meetings is a means of boosting external confidence in the company and 
generating a better understanding of long-term company strategy. Indirectly, senior managers 
seek to cultivate investors through press relations, especially the business press (section 6). 
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Investors and Management Practice: 
 
A Literature Review 
Introduction 
 
Financial institutions are widely believed to play an increasingly important role in corporate 
management. A greater role for investors represents a socio-legal-economic movement that came 
about because of the newly increased concentration of ownership, enforcement of fiduciary 
responsibility standards, and a set of grievances that united investors (Davis and Thompson, 
1994). Rather than following the traditional approach of the ‘City Rule’ – to sell the company’s 
stock if they feel that the company is poorly managed, many investment managers now 
encourage the company to change its management practice. 
 
After a stream of corporate failures in the early twenty-first century, investors have realised that 
activism (a term that will be used throughout this report to refer to investors engaging with the 
management of investee companies) has an important role to play in stopping problems before 
they get out of hand. This reflects a fundamental change in investor behaviour. Traditionally, big 
investors have shied away from criticising or directly interfering in company management. To 
vote against management at shareholder meetings has been considered an unattractive option as 
direct confrontation with management was deemed to be negative for the business. Notable 
exceptions have been CalPERS, the California Public Employees' Retirement System, and 
Hermes, a British fund. But many investors are now more aware of the far greater potential cost 
when things go wrong. 
 
A greater focus by investors on company management is also leading to a better understanding of 
where potential problems lurk. The main areas of focus are, not surprisingly, on the audit process 
and general disclosure requirements.  But fund managers and other investors are now developing 
a deeper understanding of the key areas of company management practice. In particular, they are 
developing a more integrated view of the totality of management issues. Company scandals 
following Enron have been a chastening reminder that company management has many 
dimensions, beyond the financial. It is clear from the literature that investors are increasingly 
concerned about the quality, reliability and transparency of the information they are getting as 
well as the quality and standards of company management. 
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 A glance at the performance of the few dedicated activist funds suggests that as an investment 
strategy activism can work remarkably well. The obvious example is the Hermes Focus funds, 
which, since their inception in 1998, have produced annual returns of at least 5 per cent over the 
FTSE all-share index. In the US, the fund run by Relational Investors has also outperformed its 
benchmarks since being launched in 1996. Hermes has established itself as a champion of 
shareholder activism and has set up a €300 million fund to specifically target under-performing 
companies with corporate governance issues. Partly as a result of its activities, the issue of non-
executive directors has become a hotly-,debated topic in the UK with some even calling for a 
direct role for investors in company management. 
 
Some other general trends in investor behaviour can also be discerned arising largely from a 
multitude of changes in the structure of investment finance. For instance, because of the growing 
concentration of equity shareholding in the UK and USA (over 10 per cent of all shares in the 25 
largest firms in the USA was held by the top five institutions as reported by Ghilarducci et al 
1997) the use of the exit strategy by investors as a disciplinary device has become of limited value. 
As a result, institutional investors are increasingly taking a ‘managerial investment’ approach to 
mould and influence management practice in areas such as business strategy, appointment of top 
executives, executive compensation etc. Gospel and Pendleton (2003) indicate that such 
managerial approaches sometimes take the form of private meetings between top managers and 
major investment managers, supplemented by extensive semi-public information flows, in which 
investors attempt to assess the credibility and coherence of business strategies and the quality of 
top management. 
 
Against this background the DTI has commissioned this research project into the effects of 
financial institutions and investor behaviour on management practice. The project is being carried 
out by a team from the School of Management at the University of Southampton. This is an area 
with implications for UK competitiveness. In the section on implications for policy and future 
research in their recent report for the DTI on UK competitiveness, Porter and Ketels (2003) note 
that “The interaction between financial market structure and company behaviour has been 
looked at on an economy-wide level, but there is little systematic evidence on the impact of the 
UK financial market on UK companies’ strategy and investment choices. More systematic 
evidence would help to raise the level of debate.” This study and the follow-up case study 
research (published separately) are intended to start addressing this lack of evidence by 
identifying aspects of UK financial markets that could be affecting management practice and 
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strategies, and investigating their impacts. The project's orienting perspective is whether features 
of the UK's financial framework may be inhibiting firms from developing the activities amongst 
both managers and employees required to support innovative, competitive enterprises, relative to 
our competitor nations.  It has been suggested that the innovative enterprise requires specific 
strategies, structures, managerial behaviours and modes of organising, supported by specific 
external social, economic and institutional conditions (Lazonick, 2002). Central to providing 
these external and internal conditions is the appropriate working relationship between investors, 
financial institutions and management practice. 
 
This report views the relations between financial institutions, investors and management practice 
as multidimensional, with structural and behavioural dimensions. The structural dimension 
includes the relationship between shareholding structures and control of the firm.  Different 
types of investors have different institutional interests - private trusts, portfolio equity investors, 
institutional investors – and may be expected to have different levels and forms of influence 
upon management practice. The literature relating to the structural dimension is extensive, with 
heavy representation from financial economists and lawyers in debates on corporate governance. 
There is less analysis of the behavioural dimension, especially of the responses of financial 
institutions to day-to-day managerial performance. The behavioural dimension refers to the on-
going negotiations between the representatives of financial interests and managers, the routine 
monitoring of performance. 
 
The impact of financial institutions and investor behaviour differs between different areas of 
management practice. The impact upon the finance function is of course direct, requiring 
managers to focus upon managing relations with 'the market', including mechanisms to manage 
shareholder expectations. The impact upon senior management recruitment and selection is also 
relatively direct, especially at chief executive officer (CEO) and finance director level, where the 
issue of shareholder confidence is central; loss of the confidence of the market may lead to CEO 
dismissal. Less directly, shareholder expectations establish parameters for evaluating management 
performance. For instance, the impact of financial institutions upon the wages and salaries of 
lower level employees has been indirect, through concern with controlling overall labour costs. 
 
This part of the report is organised into six sections, and echoes the objectives identified by the 
DTI. In Section 1 the report briefly outlines various dimensions of investor behaviour, and the 
range of drivers influencing management behaviour. The role of financial institutions and 
investor behaviour is placed in its overall context. This section also provides a conceptual 
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framework for the evaluation of investor activism, in addition to offering definitions of 
constructs used in the subsequent sections. The effects of changes in institutional finance and the 
private equity market are also considered in this section. In Section 2 the report outlines how 
different types of financial institution and different types of investor may have different impacts 
upon management practice. Section 3 reviews literature on how investors interact with company 
management. This section also deals with the problem of collaboration between different types 
of investors in co-ordinating their responses to company failures. Section 4 examines different 
aspects of management practice that are influenced by financial institutions. Section 5 
summarises results of an empirical exercise into the effects of the financing choices of innovative 
firms using Datastream and company accounts. Section 6 discusses the ways in which 
management influences financial institutions, including the channels through which managers 
seek to influence investors' expectations. As this report is a literature survey, the coverage reflects 
the areas that have received attention in previous research. As will become evident, some areas of 
research have received considerable attention, whilst others have been neglected.  In particular, 
there has been considerable research on the 'activism problem' theoretically and, less thoroughly 
empirically, whilst there has been relatively little research on the relevant areas of management 
practice. We have therefore presented this section (section 4) as a collection of hypotheses for 
further research, both quantitative and qualitative. 
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1.  Dimensions of  Investor Behaviour 
 
The most fundamental change in investor behaviour in recent times is increased investor activism. 
However, there is a problem in defining investor activism. Merely taking the time to understand 
what's going on in the company and vote is a form of activism, as is any kind of proactive 
approach to company mismanagement. But much of the action is done behind closed doors.  We 
define investor activism as the use of power by an investor either to influence the management 
processes of a given portfolio company or to evoke large-scale change in management processes 
across multiple companies through the symbolic targeting of one or more portfolio companies. 
All such actions can be described as the engagement process. Through these engagement processes, 
activist investors attempt to affect the strategic direction and performance of portfolio companies.  
 
As the goal of engagement varies, so, too, does the form of engagement, which ranges from co-
operative to hostile. Some investors begin their intervention with behind-the-scenes influence 
and negotiation in private, co-operative meetings with company management (Byrne, 1999; Pellet, 
1998); if this approach fails, they may next contact board members and company advisers 
(Useem, 1996). Myners Principle Six advocates an explicit activism strategy addressing when the 
fund will intervene, with what approach, and how effectiveness will be measured.  The Combined 
Code states that institutional investors should make considered use of their votes, and where 
practicable enter into dialogue (Committee on Corporate Governance, 2000).  Going public with 
their concerns is generally considered to be a last resort, as it signals to the market that firm 
management is unwilling to respond to more co-operative attempts at negotiation (Gillan and 
Starks, 2000; Prevost and Rao, 2000)1.  These more public forms of engagement include proxy 
voting (Davey, 1991), media campaigns (Rehfeld, 1998) and shareholder proposals (Del Guercio 
and Hawkins, 1999).  
 
                                                
1 One pension fund with relatively detailed public reporting squares the circle by committing that it will not report 
publicly whilst the engagement is active. 
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1.1.  Conceptual Framework 
 
Conventional agency theory is concerned with aligning the interests of shareholders (the principal) 
and those of managers (the agents). Shareholder value results from managers’ actions, which 
shareholders are not in a position to monitor directly; their success is only evident ex post. 
Managers receive compensation according to their ‘effort’ and success. For shareholders, the 
major problem is to incentivise managers to act in the best way to maximise shareholder value. 
However, shareholders are unable to ensure such maximisation because of the lack of 
information on management practice.  To remedy this deficiency the conventional solution is the 
creation of interest alignment through stock options and similar arrangements. However, this 
alignment is fragile because of information asymmetry, i.e. the shareholder’s lack of knowledge 
compared with managers. Accordingly, more investor activity is required. It is hypothesised that 
investor engagement can positively influence the value of equity. 
 
Investor engagement can be easily conceptualised within the principal-agent paradigm of 
corporate governance. Agency problems typically involve asymmetric information and 
incomplete contracts2 in which gaps may be filled through the practice of engagement (see also 
Corporate Leadership, section 4.7). Engagement allows investors to influence key management 
practices to ensure optimum shareholder value, in contrast to the ‘arms-length’ relational 
approach favoured by the conventional finance model. Such an ‘investment engagement’ 
approach is more sensitive than the financial version to the shortcomings of agency theory. 
 
Within this framework, investor engagement is a contribution to shareholder wealth 
maximisation. This assumes that company financial performance can be enhanced by 
improvements in its management practice. The UK’s Modern Company Law Review (2001) 
advocates such ‘enlightened shareholder value’ – arguing that to maximise returns to shareholders, 
good managers must take the interests of other stakeholders into account. 
 
Investors can influence corporate governance measures in a variety of ways, including external 
control measures, internal governance measures, and measures relating to executive 
compensation that align incentives (Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Chidambaran and 
Woidtke, 1999). The traditional ‘arms-length finance paradigm’ of governance is represented by 
control measures that affect outside bidders’ ability to gain control and thereby maintain the 
                                                
2 Asymmetric information is when two or more people (or economic ‘agents’ such as firms) do not have the same 
level of information. Incomplete contracts are those that do not specify terms in the event of all contingencies. 
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option of ‘exit’ (Parkinson, 1995). By contrast, engagement enables investors to exercise ‘voice’, and 
discipline management more directly and flexibly. 
 
Engagement practices have grown rapidly over the last few decades to account for the practices 
of a significant body of financial institutions. Growth has been paralleled by the emergence – first 
in the US and more recently in the UK – of funds that seek to establish their ‘thorough’ 
credentials through engagement with companies to change their practices and performance. 
 
Unlike the conventional ‘arms-length’ approach, most activist investors use their ownership 
stakes to engage with companies which under-perform, rather than excluding such companies 
from their investments. They have therefore effectively turned from ‘exit’ to ‘voice’ (Parkinson, 
1995) in their relationships with unsatisfactory companies. Institutional investors – notably 
pension funds, whose fiduciary duties mean it is difficult for them to exit in response to 
performance concerns, fit more closely the engagement model of investor relations. 
 
Investor engagement involves principal-agent relationships that are inherently incompletely 
specified and in which the knowledge of investors and managers differs; it is impossible to 
specify fully the requirements of managerial contracts at senior, strategic levels, and the amount 
of information available to investors and managers is inevitably different. Although several 
leading UK and US investors now routinely apply engagement strategies, there are no agreed 
standards of engagement content, practice, reporting or governance against which their 
effectiveness and quality could be assessed. 
 
We therefore develop a spectrum of engagement practices in Figure 1 that fall between ‘indirect 
control’ (of which exit and the threat of exit represent examples) and ‘direct corporate control’ as 
means of disciplining management. This framework suggests that investor engagement involves 
measures including external control, internal governance and dialogue and negotiation. 
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Figure 1: The Spectrum of Engagement in Governance 
Approach Description Discipline 
Laissez faire ‘Let well alone’ Exit or threat of exit 
External control Activism to protect exit 
(e.g. to remove anti-
takeover measures) 
Shareholder resolutions 
Internal governance Influencing membership 
and independence of board 
Selection non-executives 
Dialogue and negotiation Face to face dialogue, and 
relational investing 
Persuasion 
Shareholder dominance Direct control Directly ordering 
 
Figure 1 summarises the different approaches taken by investors towards engagement.  The 
means used to exert influence range from exit or the threat of exit, the traditional ‘arms-length’ 
approach, to direct shareholder control.  These approaches may be represented as different 
points on a spectrum of engagement, as in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: The Spectrum of Engagement 
Spectrum of Engagement 
Direct Control Indirect Control 
 
Pro-active 
(Dialogue and 
negotiation to affect 
performance) 
Responsive  
(Private investment 
decisions related to 
performance.) 
 
Within this spectrum of engagement, shareholder resolutions that go to a vote are a small sub-set, 
more common in the US than the UK, which can be seen as failures of monitoring and may 
damage the standing of companies with the market (Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). 
Negotiated settlements between shareholder activists and companies offer a closer parallel to 
engagement than shareholder resolutions because they allow for greater flexibility; shareholder 
resolutions are binding, and are thus seen as a last resort. Negotiated settlements are more likely 
to deliver the changes sought by investors than shareholder activism in general, with significant – 
if variable – financial consequences (Wahl, 1996; Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 1996; 
Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999; Gillan and Starks, 2001).  
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 Effective negotiations require credible threats. These are provided in the US by resolutions, and 
in the UK by pre-emption rights for existing shareholders in new share offers, designed to 
protect existing shareholders against potential dilution (Holland, 1998). In the UK, shareholder 
resolutions are rare – only a handful, rather than hundreds each year. But investors still have 
influence over companies, and are not necessarily more passive. Beyond such publicly observable 
events, Holland (1998) found less public relationships that he characterised as: “a long-term, 
private, programmed set of regular interactions between financial institutions and companies in 
which implicit financial institution relationship influence was exercised” (p.249) (public in the 
sense of open, private in the sense of confidential). 
Investor engagement therefore differs from arms-length approaches, as it does not only arise in 
response to crisis, but seeks to prevent crises (see Figure 3). Institutions typically use their 
leverage to negotiate or demand changes in management practice. Therefore dialogue rather than 
the threat of replacement is the norm in the current climate of investor relations.  
 
Figure 3: The Paradigms Contrasted 
 Arms-length approach Engagement approach 
Aim 
 
To maximise shareholder 
value 
To maximise shareholder 
value 
Business case for 
‘activism’ 
To create appropriate 
management incentives 
To improve company 
practice 
Use of voice In response to performance To affect and improve 
performance 
Engagement targeting Company-oriented Issue-oriented 
Collaborative partners Primarily other investors Investors and stakeholder 
groups, including 
employees and suppliers 
Standards for 
engagement 
Loose; open ‘Proprietary’ to a coalition; 
process and content 
 
The Context of Management Practice: Management practice responds to the external and internal 
contexts of the firm, in the light of the firm's objectives and the interests, norms, values and 
beliefs of the senior managers. Historically, the major relevant features of the external 
environment considered by mainstream management researchers have been product markets 
(especially the level of product market competition), labour markets (the demand for and supply 
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of labour), the rate of scientific and technological change, political institutions and policies and 
social and cultural values (see, for example, Ackroyd, 2002; Pettigrew and Fenton, 2000). Capital 
markets have not figured prominently in management research, although obviously are central in 
finance and financial economics.  
 
The main features of the internal context of the firm examined are the production process, 
including both physical and social technology, formal organisational structures and processes, 
especially the distribution of authority, formal and informal relations, both vertical and horizontal, 
as well as the interests and attitudes of non-managerial employees. 
 
In the 1990s there were major changes in the external and internal contexts of firms, which led to 
overall changes in management practice. The major changes in the external context included: the 
fragmentation of product markets, the growth of competition, especially international 
competition, slack labour markets, a high rate of technological change, affecting both products 
and production processes, and changing political and cultural values, including emergent 
environmental concerns. Significant external contextual changes usually neglected by 
management researchers, but of long-term importance, include demographic change - increased 
life expectancy (in most countries), lower birth rates, diminishing average household size with 
increasing numbers of single person households, changing migration patterns. Such demographic 
changes affect the expectations of the clients of institutional investors.  
 
Major changes in the internal context include the widespread use of information technology (IT) 
in production processes, control systems, communication networks and in the provision of 
services; changing organisational structures, with the decentralisation of authority, reductions in 
hierarchy (but often with the 'strategic isolation' of senior managers, ill-informed of day-to-day 
operations); new forms of work organisation; increased need for horizontal as well as vertical 
communications; weakened collective organisation amongst non-managerial employees, and its 
near elimination amongst managerial employees. Managers have responded to the new contexts 
with increased sophistication, involving new forms of competition and collaboration, 
(internationalisation, globalisation, strategic alliances), new approaches to production ('diversified 
quality production', 'flexible specialisation', lean manufacturing) as well as the development of 
new products and services. The unifying themes amongst management researchers are more 
rapid change, increased uncertainty and greater risk. 
 
Although all changes in the external and internal contexts affect relations between investors and 
managers to some degree, some changes are more directly relevant than others. Amongst the 
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most significant factors in the external context are demographic changes, with pension funds 
under pressure to maintain revenue to service pension commitments. Political changes also affect 
relations between investors and managers, both directly, e.g. controversies over shareholders' 
rights, and indirectly, e.g. political sensitivity to concerns of a class of voters e.g. pensioners. 
Changes in the internal context, especially the increased use of IT, also affect 
shareholder/manager relations, with greater access to information and faster capability in 
responding to information received. Our discussion of investor’s role in company management in 
Section 4 therefore emphasises both external and internal contexts affecting relations between 
investors and managers. 
 
1.2.  Levels of Institutional Ownership  
 
The pattern of shareholding in both the US and the UK changed in the second part of the last 
century with a move away from ownership by individuals to institutional ownership. For the UK, 
the Office for National Statistics (2003) report that there has been a decline in the proportion of 
shares held by individuals since 1963, when individuals owned 54 per cent of shares in listed 
companies, to 14.3 per cent at the end of 2002.   
 
Institutional stock ownership is much more concentrated in the UK than in other leading 
markets, encouraging much closer ties between leading shareholders and corporate management. 
More than three-quarters - 76.5 per cent - of U.K. stock market capitalisation was held by 
institutional investors in 1994  (see Table 1). In the United States, institutional investors owned 
47.4 per cent of outstanding equity, as of June 30, 1996. (Data were drawn from a variety of 
sources with differing dates.)  
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Table 1: Concentration of Institutional Assets: Estimated Institutional Investor Share of 
Outstanding Equity [*] as of June 1997 
 U.S. U.K. France Germany 
All institutions 
 
47.4% 76.5% 59.8% 39.0% 
Largest 25 institutions 
 
27.5% 31.9% 14.4% 9.5% 
Largest 25 institutions’ 
share of institutional 
Holdings 
58.0% 41.7% 24.1% 24.4% 
Sources: The Conference Board, CDA Spectrum 
 
[*] Outstanding equity is based on the following: In the United States, total equities traded on all 
stock exchanges plus all over-the-counter trading (December 1996); in the United Kingdom, 
based on share register analysis of listed companies by the Office of National Statistics 
(December 1994); in France, data from the Banque de France (March 1997); and in Germany, 
data from Office of National Statistics (December 1996). 
 
But total figures fail to reveal just how concentrated ownership is in some markets. For example, 
the top 25 British institutional shareholders control 44.1 per cent of the stock of Britain's 25 
largest companies. In Germany, the comparable proportion is only 14.5 per cent, while it is 23.5 
per cent in France and 27.5 per cent in the United States.  
 
The level of institutional ownership directly bears on how shareholders and corporate 
management interact. Higher concentration of ownership has led to much greater levels of 
relationship investing among U.K. pension funds and money managers than elsewhere. The 
proportionate stock ownership by pension funds, which typically are more assertive about 
shareholder rights issues, significantly affects corporate management behaviour. In the U.K., 
domestic pension funds account for 42.4 per cent of institutional financial assets. In the United 
States, funds play a somewhat smaller role, at 35 per cent of financial assets. In contrast, domestic 
pension funds accounted for only 5.9 per cent of institutional investments in Germany, and 
virtually none in France. 
 
Different types of institutional players are dominant elsewhere: in France, insurance companies 
account for 50.2 per cent of institutional financial assets, while managed funds account for the 
rest. In Germany, insurance companies held 61 per cent of institutional financial assets, with 
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managed funds accounting for 33.2 per cent. But both French and German governments are 
considering legislation that would encourage development of private pension systems, which 
could eventually lead to significant changes. 
 
With $11.9 trillion in assets, US institutions have about six times the amount of British 
institutional assets and 10 times those in France and Germany. Asset mixes are affected by 
varying historical and cultural biases, as well as regulatory and tax issues. As a group, UK 
institutional investors had the highest allocation to equities, at 69 per cent of assets. US 
institutions were a distant second, at 36 per cent, while French and German allocations lagged at 
22 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively. But as German and French companies continue 
unwinding these cross-holdings and family-owned companies seek financing from the public 
market, the governance dynamic will change. 
 
The existence of shareholders with large stakes, as measured by monetary value, has been 
assumed to provide a partial correction to free-rider problems3; the costs of intervention may be 
relatively small. Accordingly there are suggestions that institutional investors have a role to play in 
corporate management. However, although the monetary value of shares in one company held by 
an institution may be large, the proportion of the total equity held is likely to be small. In this 
sense the institutional investor is in a similar position to the individual in a diffusely-held 
company in that it bears the full costs of monitoring and intervening where appropriate, but gains 
only a fraction of the benefit. An investor who is unhappy with a company faces a choice 
between selling the investment (‘exit’), becoming involved with the company (‘voice’), or not 
intervening while still holding the investment (‘loyalty’). 
 
A number of reasons have been advanced to explain why some institutional investors adopt the 
second of these options, investor activism (‘voice’). First, it is suggested that investors may risk 
inadequate diversification if they sell their investment in a company. The cost of involvement is 
therefore seen as being offset by the benefit of a more widely diversified portfolio. Second, the 
growth in indexed funds has meant that institutions attempt to increase the performance of the 
market as a whole by targeting and intervening in under-performing companies. There are 
assumed to be spillover effects from the targeting of one company into the market as a whole. 
Finally, the increased use of anti takeover provisions by US companies is seen as restricting the 
                                                
3 Free-riders are those who benefit from the actions of others without doing anything themselves. If there is a large 
group of agents who would all benefit from the actions of just one (or very few) of their number, this can lead to 
problems - why should one of them incur the cost of making the action, if she/he can sit back and wait for someone 
else to do it? 
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operation of the market for corporate control, leading institutional investors to act to prevent 
their use. 
 
Karpoff (2001) identifies three views of institutional investor activism. The first is that activist 
investors are monitors who ameliorate some of the incentive and control problems associated 
with large, diffusely owned, companies. Through their proposals and contact with companies, 
institutional investors are seen to indirectly influence managers to make organisational changes, 
change corporate governance or modify strategy. The second view is of activist investors as being 
bullies, interfering with the company’s management. This may have negative consequences as 
fund managers may lack appropriate abilities in their intervention with management, or their 
focus is on short-term performance to the detriment of the long term. Further, investors may be 
pursuing non-value maximising objectives, for example, by adopting social welfare objectives. 
Finally, there is a view that investor activists are ineffective and have little influence on the 
policies, operations and values of targeted companies. 
 
It is largely an empirical question as to whether institutional investor actions are effective. There 
are now several studies of the effectiveness of institutional investors on company behaviour. 
Most of these studies are of US public companies. However, there are similarities between the 
institutional structures in the US and UK. For example, Black and Coffee (1994) write: 
 
“The legal culture of Britain is as similar to our own as we are likely to find; in Britain, 
like the United States and unlike most of the rest of the world, most large corporations 
are public and not family-controlled; the United Kingdom has long had a liquid 
securities market; the British ‘City’ has the same array of financial institutions that we 
do (commercial banks, insurers, mutual funds, investment banks, private and public 
pension funds); stock ownership in both Britain and the United States has come in the 
last few decades to be dominated by institutions...”. 
 
It is also important to recognise differences. Black and Coffee go on to write: “Financial 
institutions in the United Kingdom are significantly less regulated than their American 
counterparts — though less regulated does not mean unregulated. In particular, Britain has no 
counterpart to the Glass- Steagall Act or to US restrictions on interstate banking, which limit the 
size and power of American banks. Nor does it have our history of limiting stock ownership by 
insurance companies or regulating collective shareholder action.” 
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1.3.  The Effectiveness of Engagement 
 
The empirical literature on institutional activism and engagement has been reviewed by Black 
(1998), Gillan and Starks (1998), Karpoff (2001), and Romano (2001). The picture of the effect of 
activism on companies is, at first sight, somewhat confusing, with some studies suggesting that 
activism is effective whilst others report the opposite. These contradictory findings can be 
accounted for by differences in the design of the studies. First, studies differ in the definition of 
‘success’, the dependent variable. Karpoff (2001) identifies six different criteria: (a) increase in 
share price; (b) improvement in accounting measures of performance; (c) change in management 
and/or operations; (d) adoption of proposals by activist investors; (e) some action attributed to 
shareholder pressure; and (f) a shareholder proposal receiving support from other investors. 
Second, studies differ in the event, the independent variable that represents the action by 
institutional investors. This may be a proposal for a resolution by one or more institutions, the 
announcement that institutional investor(s) and a company have reached agreement, or the 
inclusion of a company in a list of targeted companies drawn up by an activist investor, such as 
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), or the Council of Institutional 
Investors (CII). Third, there are differences in the issue that is of concern: the adoption of anti 
take-over defences, management compensation, board structure, etc. Finally, there are differences 
in sample sizes and in the time period covered in the studies. This may be important because the 
effects of investor activism may have changed over time. 
 
The literature is examined here in the following sections: (1) event studies which examine the 
effect on company share prices of information about institutional intervention; and (2) the 
impact of intervention on long-term financial performance as measured through share prices 
and/or accounting information.  The literature on the impact of engagement upon management 
practice, leadership and skills has been mainly concerned with the alignment of interests through 
stock option schemes, and the role of non-executive directors, although Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
have pointed to often negative impacts of shareholder influence (2001). 
 
1.3.1.  Event Studies 
 
A method for assessing the impact of investor activism is to examine share price reactions to 
announcements that a company is being targeted. If investors perceive monitoring by institutions 
as leading to improved performance and/or reduced agency costs, then the targeting 
announcement should be associated with abnormal positive returns. Most of these studies focus 
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on shareholder proposals. However, these studies may also examine the announcement of 
agreements between companies and institutional investors and on non-proxy announcements. 
 
A number of studies (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; 
Gillan and Starks, 2000; Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling, 1996; Prevost and Rao, 2000; M.P. 
Smith, 1998; Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner, 1996; and Wahal, 1996) examine the short-term price 
effects of the announcement of shareholder proposals. There are differences between the studies 
in the event date selected - initial press announcement, the proxy mailing date, and the date of the 
shareholder meeting - with some studies including more than one event date. 
 
The general finding from the studies is that there are no statistically significant cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs), either positive or negative, around the event date. A major exception is 
that Prevost and Rao (2000) report statistically significant negative CARs surrounding the proxy 
mailing dates for firms targeted by CalPERS and by coalitions of public funds. They interpret this 
finding as being consistent with the hypothesis that the announcement of a formal submission of 
a proposal signals a breakdown of negotiations between the institutional investors and the 
company. Prevost and Rao found that the negative returns were transitory for companies 
targeted once, but permanent for companies targeted on two or more occasions. Other 
exceptions relate to the issue on which the proposal is directed. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 
(1998), although finding no significant difference overall, did find statistically significant negative 
CARs on proposals relating to board diversity, mainly proposals that the company include 
women on the board, and positive CARs with proposals on blank cheque preferred stock 
(unissued preferred shares4 whose terms and conditions may be determined by the Board of 
Directors), a take-over defence or poison pill. Gillan and Starks (2000), who also generally found 
no significant findings overall, also found positive CARs on proposals concerning poison pills. 
Three of the studies include analysis of the effect of the announcement of an agreement between 
the targeted company and the institution. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) and Del 
Guercio and Hawkins (1999) failed to find significant CARs associated with the announcement 
of agreement. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, whose study is of companies targeted by TIAA-
CREFF, indicated this may be due to the small number of companies in their sample that actually 
announced agreement with the fund. Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1996) find positive abnormal 
returns around the announcement of agreements between companies and the United 
Shareholders Association (USA), a body representing the interests of small shareholders. Finally, 
Wahal (1996) reports positive CARs following non-proxy announcements. These are generally 
                                                
4 Preferred shares have a defined dividend, and a prior claim on company income to normal shares. 
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not announcements on specific issues but rather expressions of concern by institutions about 
company performance. 
 
1.3.2.  Long-Term Post-Targeting Performance 
 
The event study methodology tests the extent to which investors and other market participants 
expect company performance to change after the targeting announcement. The actual effect of 
intervention by institutional investors can be investigated by examining the performance of 
targeted companies in the period following the announcement. Two aspects of companies’ long-
term performance are examined in the literature: share price performance and performance as 
reflected in accounting numbers. The literature on companies included in the CalPERS’ and CII 
focus lists is reviewed separately. 
 
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), Prevost and Rao (2000) and Wahal (1996) examine the share 
price performance of shares during the two or three year period after targeting. The results 
generally suggest that there are no significant differences between the performance of targeted 
companies and controls or industry means. Prevost and Rao however find evidence that 
companies targeted more than once significantly underperform. The general finding of no 
significant impact of targeting on performance is supported by Gillan, Kensinger and Martin 
(2000) in their case study of Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
 
The other method of assessing the effect of targeting by investors is to examine changes in 
accounting measures of performance. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998), Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1999), Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (2000) and Wahal (1996) generally find no 
significant changes in accounting measures of performance (various measures of return on assets, 
return on sales, sales growth and asset growth), although Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling report 
that sales growth in the post-targeting period is lower for targeted companies than for the control 
group. Prevost and Rao (2000) find overall that changes in operating performance following 
intervention are lower for targeted companies than matched pairs. When companies targeted 
more than once are separated from other companies, the lower performance is restricted to those 
companies targeted more than once. 
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 Box I: CalPERS: A Case Study 
One approach to assessing the effect of institutional investors on investee 
companies is to examine the pre- and post- listing characteristics of targeted 
companies. Most of the studies adopting this approach look at CalPERS, the 
largest US pension fund. 
The criteria CalPERS uses to identify companies to be included in its focus 
list have changed over time. Its first list, which was drawn up in late 1986, 
was of companies who had implemented poison pills (takeover defences) 
without shareholder approval. Of these companies, those selected for the list 
were those with high levels of institutional ownership. In late 1987 the 
criterion was extended to include other corporate governance issues, mainly 
to promote confidential voting, and in the following year the primary 
criterion shifted from corporate governance to performance (M.P. Smith, 
1996). Currently, CalPERS uses three factors for selecting companies for 
inclusion in its focus list: (i) share price performance over the past three 
years; (ii) Economic Value Added (EVA); and (iii) a corporate governance 
measure that includes board structure, director compensation, and anti take-
over devices. 
Studies of companies targeted by CalPERS have used various approaches. 
The first is to look at the post targeting returns. Nesbitt (1994), looking at 42 
companies during a period between 1987 and 1992, found that companies 
targeted by CalPERS had stock returns 14%, or 2.6% per year, above the 
S&P 500 Index return for the five years following the first initiative by 
CalPERS. More recently, Nesbitt (2001) examines the 95 companies targeted 
by CalPERS between 1987 and 2000 and reports that over the first year 
following targeting the 95 companies outperform the S&P 500 Index by 
1.4%. M.P. Smith (1996) shows that companies targeted by CalPERS had 
excess returns of approximately 11% over the three-year period after 
targeting. The returns were higher for those companies adopting CalPERS’ 
proposals or making corporate governance changes. Nevertheless, Smith 
shows that there are no statistically significant differences in operating 
performance in the post-targeting period. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) 
find the returns of their target sample to the S&P 500 are similar to those 
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reported by Nesbitt (1994), but that this is not significantly higher. They 
found a similar result for their control sample of companies of similar 
industry, size, and performance, and suggest that the stronger performance 
attributed to CalPERS’ targeting may be due to a tendency to rebound from 
poor performance or mean reversion. More recently, English, Smythe, and 
McNeil (2004) report that the results for longer-term post-listing returns 
depend on the statistical method used. Market-adjusted and matching 
company returns provide evidence of positive abnormal returns for up to 6 
months, with some evidence of negative returns out to 5 years. By way of 
contrast, market model-adjusted returns indicate positive abnormal returns 
over all time horizons. The authors place greater reliance on the matching 
firm methodology, and so conclude that there is limited evidence of positive 
abnormal returns for periods greater than 6 months following listing. 
 
Opler and Sokobin (1995) examine the performance of companies targeted by the Council for 
Institutional Investors (CII). The CII is an organisation of large pension funds that seeks to 
encourage members to play an active role in protecting plan assets. The Council selects 
companies for its focus list if they had lower share price returns than a broad market index over a 
five year period, and their S&P industry group over one-, three- and five-year periods. Opler and 
Sokobin (1995) report that in the year following listing, companies demonstrate share price 
increases of 11.6 per cent greater than the S&P500. 
 
Box II: UKAV's Corporate Governance Style: A Case Study 
Until recently, UK Active Value Fund was little more than an irritant to a 
handful of small U.K. listed companies. Combative to the point of tipping 
the press off about companies in need of radical change, it rallied support for 
sweeping out management, selling off divisions or restructuring finances. 
However, things are rapidly changing. 
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Late last year CalPERS (California Public Employees' Retirement System) 
allotted $200 million to a new UKAV vehicle, Active Value Capital. UKAV 
already had $250 million under management. More important, CalPERS sent 
a signal to the U.K. money management community and the companies in 
which it invests that activist investing is a coming force. 
UKAV's management has already created a stir in an environment where 
investing institutions traditionally shy away from heavyweight corporate 
governance tactics. Indeed, their heavy-handed approach to investing draws 
criticism from fellow investors and company management alike. UKAV was 
established in 1993, copying tactics applied in the US by the likes of 
Greenway Capital Corp. in New York and Relational Investors in San Diego, 
California. 
Prime targets for UKAV are companies in distress because of economic 
conditions or mismanagement. After taking a substantial (but minority) stake 
in a company, UKAV presses management to unload businesses and 
restructure.  The fund's current portfolio includes stakes in public relations 
firms Shandwick International and Chime Communications, electrical-
equipment maker Kenwood Appliances, property developer Greycoat and 
jewelry retailer Signet Group. 
UKAV's approach, aimed at unleashing locked-in value in up to ten 
companies over an average of two to three years each, has scored some 
notable successes. The value of the fund's investment in Signet has tripled 
over the past three years, helped by UKAV's pressure on the company to 
reform its antiquated capital structure. 
Although fund managers admit using the media to persuade management to 
act, they maintain that much of UKAV's work is kept out of the public eye. 
And they insist that the reluctance among fellow shareholders to act in 
alliance is declining. 
 
1.4.  Private Equity Investments 
 
Myners (2000) describes private equity as representing a “wide range of risk capital investments 
made by specialist investment managers in all types of companies, using share capital that is 
privately held rather than publicly tradable” (p. 152).  The term private equity as used in the UK, 
and much of continental Europe, therefore refers to equity investment in any type of unquoted 
company. This contrasts with the US where the term private equity is reserved for the financing 
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of leveraged management buy-outs (MBOs) and buy-ins (MBIs), and the term venture capital is 
usually used to refer to the provision of funds for young, entrepreneurial businesses. Private 
equity investments are made by a financial intermediary, a private equity firm, who in the UK 
invests in the share capital of unquoted companies, some of which will be young, entrepreneurial 
businesses and others will be MBOs and MBIs. This report will use the UK definition of private 
equity, except when referring to activities in the US. 
 
Private equity firms raise funds from investors and the funds are used to invest in unquoted 
companies. The private equity investment activity itself is often divided into four stages. First, 
there is the identification of those companies that would make profitable investments. This 
selection process involves the collection, sorting and analysis of information. Second, having 
identified appropriate companies, it is necessary to structure the investment. This involves the 
issue of appropriate equity securities by the portfolio company, the provision of managerial 
incentives, and creation of effective mechanisms for the private equity firm to influence the 
company’s operations. Third, there is monitoring and active participation in the management of 
portfolio companies. This may be through board membership or other channels, and the analysis 
of financial and other information provided by the portfolio company. Finally, there is the 
disposal of investments, or exiting, and distributing cash or marketable securities to investors. Not 
all private equity firms will follow this activist model. 
 
The most widely used investment vehicle for private equity investments is the limited partnership. 
The limited partnership consists of general partners and limited partners. The general partners are 
usually senior managers in partnership management firms[i.e. private equity firms]. They have 
responsibility for managing the partnership’s investments, and may contribute a small proportion 
of capital. The remainder of the partnership capital is provided by the limited partners. 
Partnership capital is invested during the early years of the partnership, and then investments are 
managed and slowly liquidated and distributions made to the limited partners either as cash or 
securities. 
 
Limited partners delegate the management of their funds to the general partners and so must be 
concerned to ensure that their interests are safeguarded. General partners may act against the 
interests of the limited partners by, for example, charging excessive fees, failing to monitor 
portfolio companies, or reserving the most attractive investment opportunities for themselves. 
Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995) suggest that this problem is mitigated in two ways. The first is 
through the need for private equity management firms to have a good reputation. This is because 
the partnerships have finite lives and so it is necessary for private equity managers to raise funds 
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at regular intervals for new partnerships. Fund raising, which involves making presentations to 
potential investors and their advisers, is both time consuming and costly. A good track record 
conveys information about the firm’s ability to manage investors’ funds, and may also make it 
easier to raise new funds from those that invested in previous partnerships. The second is 
through linking the compensation of general partners to performance.  
 
General partners receive a management fee, 1 to 3 per cent of committed capital, together with a 
share of a partnership’s profits. The share of the profits, referred to as carried interest, is at the core 
of the partnership’s incentive structure. This is typically set at 20 per cent of the net profit of the 
partnership. In early agreements, the profit was usually calculated on individual investments; but 
more recent agreements are generally based on the return on the partnership’s portfolio. In 
addition, Burgel (2000) reports that many partnership contracts include a so-called hurdle rate, 
which may be a pure hurdle where profits in excess of the hurdle rate are shared between limited 
and general partners, or a catch-up hurdle where limited partners have preferential access to the 
profits if the total returns are below the hurdle. 
 
In addition, the limited partners’ interests may be protected through covenants contained within 
the partnership agreement. These may include restrictions on the type of investment that can be 
made, or on other activities of the general partner. For example, there may be covenants 
restricting the proportion of the fund that can be invested in any one company, or the amount of 
debt that the partnership can raise, or may require cash to be distributed immediately on disposal 
of investments. Finally, partnerships may have advisory boards, whose membership includes the 
largest limited partners, that resolve potential conflicts of interest between general and limited 
partners. The activities of advisory boards may be restricted by the legal requirement that limited 
partners should not be involved in active management. 
 
The partnership itself has a finite life of about ten years. The activities of the partnership start 
with identifying those companies into which an investment should be made, structuring the 
investment, monitoring and intervening in portfolio companies, and finally selling the interest in 
the companies and returning cash and marketable securities to the limited partners. The structure 
of private equity has been viewed as a two-level agency problem. One problem is the relationship 
between general and limited partners; the other is the relationship between general partners and 
the managements of portfolio companies. The interests of general partners are aligned with those 
of the investors through the need to maintain reputation in order to raise funds for future 
partnerships, and through compensation which is mainly determined by the returns on portfolio 
investments. 
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 Differences between financial institutions and private equity funds: The relationship between financial 
institutions and the listed companies in which they invest is very different to that between private 
equity firms and portfolio companies. In the former, the institution usually holds a relatively 
small proportion of the investee companies’ equity, and does not hold any rights other than those 
incorporated into the traded securities. Private equity investments, on the other hand, are 
structured so as to provide strong incentives for portfolio company management and to provide 
mechanisms through which general partners can effectively monitor and control their 
investments. In addition, private equity firms can exert influence through staging funding to 
portfolio companies, with additional funding being contingent on company and managerial 
performance. 
 
The way in which investments are structured so as to provide appropriate incentives and to 
enable effective monitoring and control would seem to be the key feature of private equity 
finance. There appears to be greater variability in the way in which private equity firms deal with 
post-investment monitoring and intervention compared to institutional investors. Some firms 
adopt a hands-on approach, becoming involved with portfolio companies, while for others the 
approach is hands-off. Even with a hands-on approach, only a relatively small amount of time is 
spent with portfolio companies. The types of issues on which general partners are involved are to 
do with monitoring, networking and strategic issues. This reflects the special abilities that general 
partners possess. Contacts that general partners have with a range of companies, professionals 
and other financial institutions provide a network that managers can use in running and 
developing their companies. The knowledge that general partners have acquired through 
investments over time in other companies also is of use to the management of present 
investments in developing and implementing strategies. There is less reference in the literature to 
general partners assisting with operational issues, and there are suggestions that general partners 
are not involved in day-to-day management. General partners also have an important role in the 
dismissal of existing managers and the appointment of replacements. This would be consistent 
with the general partners taking the view that the success of portfolio companies depends on the 
quality of their managements. If the composition of the management team is the key to success, 
then it is appropriate for private equity firms to play a key part in dismissal and appointment 
proceedings. 
 
The review of the effect of private equity firms on the behaviour of portfolio companies begins 
with a brief overview of the private equity market in the UK. Although the market is much 
smaller than the one in the US, the way in which investments are structured is similar and much 
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of the funding actually comes from US investors. Private equity firms are seen as facing a two-
level principal-agent relationship. On the one hand there is the relationship between private 
equity firms and the providers of funds; and on the other there is the relationship between 
private equity firms and the managers of the companies (portfolio companies) in which they 
invest (Sahlman, 1990; Wright and Robbie, 1998). The main characteristics of the main vehicle 
used in private equity investments, the limited partnership, are considered next. Finally, the extent 
and nature of involvement by private equity firms in portfolio companies are considered. 
 
1.4.1.  The Structure of the Private Equity Market 
 
The structure of the private equity market in the UK is described by Myners (2000), Peacock and 
Cooper (2000), and Burgel (2000). At the centre of the private equity market is the investment 
vehicle that raises funds, selects and manages investments in unquoted companies (portfolio 
companies). Because investments are usually made for a finite period, it is important for the 
funds to provide for divestment. 
Investment Vehicles The British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) distinguishes between 
three main types of private equity firms: independents, captives and semi-captives. Independents are 
publicly listed or private firms, funds or investment trusts which raise capital from external 
sources. This is in contrast to captives which are private equity firms that are either wholly owned 
subsidiaries or divisions of parent companies, usually financial institutions, that manage funds on 
behalf of the parent. Finally, semi-captives are like captives in that they invest funds on behalf of the 
parent company, but unlike captives have also raised funds from external sources within the last 
five years. The investments made by these three types of UK private equity organisation in 2001 
are shown below: 
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Table 2: UK Private Equity Investments 
Amount invested  
£m  %  
Captives (organisations that invest only for a parent 
company) 
397   8  
Independents (organisations that only management 
funds) 
3,136   66  
Semi-captives (organisations which do both) 1,219  26  
Total 4,752  100  
Source: BVCA (2002) 
 
The independents therefore accounted for two-thirds of the investments in 2001. The two main 
types of independent are investment trusts and limited partnerships. Investment trusts are listed 
companies that usually have an indefinite life. Gains made on the disposal of investments are 
reinvested in the trust, and investors receive their returns through dividends and capital gains on 
trust shareholdings. Burgel (2000) describes two types of quoted funds: venture and development 
capital investment trusts (VDCIT) and venture capital trusts (VCTs). There are tax preferences 
for investors in VCTs to encourage investment in smaller companies with up to £10 million in 
assets. A partnership agreement will incorporate a number of provisions regarding the way in 
which the returns to the limited and general partners are to be determined and the life of the 
partnership. In contrast to investment trusts which usually have an indefinite life, a limited 
partnership has a finite life, usually of ten years. Much of the literature is focused on the use of 
limited partnerships as the investment vehicle. 
 
In addition to the types of investment vehicles described above there are funds of funds. These are 
structured either as limited partnerships or as investment trusts and invest their funds in a range 
of other partnerships and/or trusts to provide investors with a diversified private equity portfolio. 
 
Investors: UK private equity firms raise most of their funds from overseas sources. As shown 
below, funds from overseas sources represented 71 per cent of the total funds raised in 2001. The 
largest category of investor consists of pension funds, mainly overseas, which represent 42 per 
cent of funds raised. As a whole, UK institutional investors represent a relatively small 
proportion of the funds raised by private equity firms. Myners (2000) identifies some of the 
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barriers to institutional investors investing in private equity firms, and the UK Government has 
introduced some changes since 2000. 
 
Table 3: Sources of UK Private Equity Funds 
Amount raised % of amount raised 
UK Overseas Total UK Overseas Total 
 
£m £m £m % % % 
Pension funds 1,594 3,581 5,175 13 29 42 
Insurance companies 442 961 1,403 4 8 12 
Corporate investors 172 88 260 1 1 2 
Banks 517 1,176 1,693 4 10 14 
Funds of funds 378 1,494 1,872 3 12 15 
Government agencies 6 489 495 - 4 4 
Academic institutions 86 345 431 1 3 4 
Private individuals 182 353 535 2 2 4 
Other sources 157 222 379 1 2 3 
Total 3,534 8,709 12,243 29 71 100 
Source: BVCA (2002) 
 
Portfolio companies: Private equity within a UK context refers to investment in a range of 
unquoted companies. The BVCA defines the following use of funds: 
•Start-up: Finance for companies that are in the process of being set up, or companies that have 
been in business for a short time, where the funds are used for product development and initial 
marketing. 
•Other early stage: Finance for companies that have completed the product development stage and 
now require funds for commercial manufacturing and sales.  
•Expansion: Finance for established companies to enable them to grow and expand their 
businesses. Funds may be used for product development, marketing, capital investments, or to 
provide additional working capital. The BVCA includes funds for rescues/turnarounds in this 
category. 
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•Refinancing bank debt. 
•Secondary purchase: Funds are used to purchase existing shares in portfolio companies from other 
private equity firms, or other shareholders. 
•Management buy-out (MBO): Funds provided to enable a company’s existing management to 
acquire an established business. The BVCA includes institutional buy-outs (IBOs) in this 
category. 
•Management buy-in (MBI): Funds provided to enable external manager(s) to buy into a company. 
The funds invested in these categories in 2001 is shown below: 
Table 4: Categories of Funds Invested in 2001 
Number of Companies Amount invested  
Financing stage 
Number % £m % 
Start-up 190 15 163 4 
Other early stage 218 17 227 5 
Total early stage 408 32 390 9 
Expansion 590 45 1,339 28 
Secondary purchases 40 3 234 5 
Refinancing bank debt 23 2 63 1 
Total expansion 623 50 1,636 34 
MBO 202 15 2,520 53 
MBI 44 3 206 4 
Total MBO/MBI 246 18 2,726 57 
Total 1,307 100 4,752 100 
Source: BVCA (2001) 
 
This shows that although MBOs/MBIs represented only 18 per cent of the companies receiving 
funding from private equity firms, they received the majority of the funds. At the other extreme, 
32 per cent of the companies receiving funds were early stage investments, but these companies 
only received 9 per cent of the funds. 
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Exit Investments in portfolio companies are not usually held for the long term. In particular, 
limited partnerships have a finite life and so it is necessary for the fund to divest in order to 
return cash to investors and reward the general partners. The divestments by UK private equity 
funds in 2001 are shown below: 
Table 5: The Divestments by UK Private Equity Funds in 2001 
 
Amount divested 
Number of 
divestments 
Number of 
companies 
 
£m % Numbe
r 
% Numbe
r 
% 
Flotation 68 3 14 1 9 1 
Sale of quoted equity 226 8 278 20 196 18 
Trade sale 1,024 38 366 25 261 24 
Sale to another private equity 
firm 
163 6 27 2 17 2 
Sale to financial institutions 185 7 32 2 25 2 
Sale to management (buy-
back) 
85 3 145 10 123 11 
Divestment by other means 94 4 127 9 100 9 
Write-off 826 31 444 31 356 33 
Total 2,671 100 1,442 100 1,087 100 
Source: BVCA (2002) 
 
The main method of divestment is a trade sale where the portfolio company is sold to another 
company, usually within the same industry. A trade sale may be preferable to a flotation where 
the buyer has strategic reasons for buying the company as it can sometimes achieve a higher price 
than through a flotation. As well as realising the investment through a flotation, private equity 
firms may sometimes retain some of their investments in floated companies either because they 
expect the market price to increase or because of restrictions on the amount of equity that can be 
sold at the time of flotation. This equity may be sold later and represents the second highest 
category, other than write-off, in the above table. 
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 There are agency problems between private equity firms and portfolio companies. Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2000) describe these in terms of the managers not taking action that is optimal for 
the portfolio company because the private equity firm will receive part of the benefit. They 
identify different ways in which managerial action may fail to be optimal. These are management: 
failing to exert the optimal amount of effort; taking actions that lead to personal rather than 
company gain (spending on perks or stealing); and threatening to leave the company and so hold-
up investors. Kaplan and Strömberg examined the contracts between a number of private equity 
firms and portfolio companies with a view to identifying those features within the contracts that 
minimise these problems. As well as exerting control through the way in which investments are 
structured, private equity firms also exercise control on the management of portfolio companies 
by making funds available in stages, with the availability of additional funding being contingent 
on company performance or other factors. 
 
A distinguishing feature of private equity financing is the separation of rights over cash flow, 
including rights over net assets in the event of liquidation, from voting, board membership, and 
other forms of control (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2000 and 2001). This allows the private equity 
firm both to structure investments so as to provide incentives to the management of portfolio 
companies and to retain control rights that allow the general partners to intervene when the 
management fails to meet agreed targets.  
 
Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995) report that the senior management of portfolio companies 
frequently own a significant share of the companies’ equity. This means that the returns on share 
ownership potentially represent a sizeable component of senior management’s total 
compensation. The incentive effect may be further heightened by the inclusion of an equity earn-
out which allows management to increase their holdings if certain performance conditions are met. 
While senior management may hold ordinary shares, or common stock, private equity firms 
usually hold convertible preferred shares issued by the portfolio company. This is seen by Fenn, 
Liang and Prowse (1995) to have two advantages. First, because holders of convertible preferred 
shares have a superior claim over the profits and assets of the portfolio company, the investment 
risk is lower than for ordinary shares. Second, the superior claim over profits and assets provides 
a greater incentive to management because the value of the securities they hold is dependent on 
the residual profits and assets after the claims of convertible preferred shareholders have been 
met. 
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The use of convertible preferred shares provides private equity firms with superior claims to 
those held by managers over the assets of portfolio companies. Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) 
report that the value of these claims is usually as large as the original investment made by private 
equity firms in portfolio companies. They also report that in a number of cases the liquidation 
rights are strengthened by making the dividends on the preferred shares cumulative, so adding to 
the size of private equity firms’ claims. Claims may be further strengthened by redemption 
provisions or put options that give private equity firms the right to demand redemption of the 
securities after a defined period of time.  
 
Although it is usual for voting rights to be attached only to residual equity, i.e. ordinary shares or 
common stock, the voting rights of securities issued by portfolio companies are generally not 
confined to residual equity. Holders of convertible preferred shares may have voting rights as if 
the instrument had been converted, and voting rights may also be available to holders of 
subordinated debt. In addition, portfolio companies may issue separate classes of voting and 
non-voting shares. Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) find that private equity firms hold on average 
55.8 per cent of the voting rights which may increase to 70.8 per cent under certain contingencies. 
They also find that voting control by private equity firms is greater in early stage investments. 
 
Private equity firms may also exert control and influence through board membership. General 
partners may be directors of portfolio companies and/or they may nominate outsiders as 
directors. In many cases private equity firms dominate the boards of portfolio companies. Like 
voting control, the composition of the board membership may be contingent on the performance 
of the portfolio company, with poor performance leading to greater representation of the private 
equity firm on the board. Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) find that on average boards have just 
over six directors. Private equity firms have control in 26 per cent of portfolio companies, 
management have control in 12 per cent of cases, and in the remaining 62 per cent of companies 
neither the private equity firm nor management have control. They also found that provisions 
that increased representation under conditions of poor performance were to be found in 15 per 
cent of portfolio companies. 
 
Summary and Discussion: Private equity firms have an important role in funding young, 
entrepreneurial business, expanding older companies and in the restructuring of large enterprises 
through MBOs/MBIs. Private equity firms raise most of their finance from overseas investors, 
with US institutions providing a significant proportion of the investments. UK institutions have a 
relatively small role in funding private equity investment. 
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2.  The Propensity to Intervene 
 
As the various classes of investors become increasingly active in the U.K.’s corporate arena, it 
will become more and more critical to understand the heterogeneity of this investor class. The 
engagement model presented here is intended to inform about the likelihood of investors’ 
intervening with their portfolio companies: a comprehensive summary is provided in Table 6 on 
page 69. This analysis demonstrates that a complex set of characteristics helps to shape the 
venture firms and institutional investors’ propensity for engagement. 
 
For example, we argue that a public sector pension plan that matched certain characteristics such 
as a relatively large percentage of its fund invested in a relatively large proportion of the target 
company’s stock is most likely to intervene. However, to conclude that public pension funds are 
therefore the most activist across the board would be misleading. A smaller, internally managed, 
very diversified public pension plan with an active portfolio might divest the same company’s 
stock at the first sign of trouble. It is clear that classifying a fund by type is not a sufficient 
predictor of either its level of engagement or its impact on firm performance. Thus, when 
examining investors’ effect on performance, one must consider the shareholder mix presented by 
individual corporations. 
 
Within this general context, the micro-level behaviour of investment firms may diverge 
considerably. Institutional investors normally have a complex set of engagement strategies, 
resulting in varied levels of impact on company management. For instance, unit trust and mutual 
funds use market instruments extensively as they compete directly for domestic savings on the 
basis of performance. Similarly, pension fund managers actively engage in monitoring the 
company behaviour as their contracts are awarded on the basis of investment performance. By 
contrast, insurance firms typically take a long-term view in their investment goals due to the fact 
that the pattern of claims against them is both fairly predictable and long-term (Black and Coffee 
1994). Therefore, investor constraints on management will be determined by the nature of the 
portfolio of investors, at least to a certain extent. 
 
We discuss below the likelihood of intervention by different types of investor. 
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2.1.  Public Sector Pension Plans  
 
Public pension funds provide retirement and other benefits to employees in the public sector.  As 
with all pension funds, the funds’ trustees have fiduciary duties to their members and usually 
have a long-term investment horizon. Also, like private schemes, many public pension funds 
employ fund managers to manage all, or part of, their investment portfolios.  Public sector 
pension funds differ considerably in size; with some ranking amongst the largest pension funds in 
both the UK and US.  Some public pension plans, such as CalPERS, are among the largest 
institutional investors in the world (Zorn, 1996); even including small funds, on average, public 
pension plans have the largest equity holdings of any institutional investor (Coffee, 2001). For 
example, public pension funds represent 18.8 per cent of institutional equity holdings in the US 
and have 15 million beneficiaries (Employee Benefits Research Institute, 1999). While 
approximately 800 public pension funds exist in the United States (Zorn, 1996), the largest are 
monolithic, such as the $163 billion CalPERS fund (CalPERS, 2001).  It is often suggested that 
public pension funds are less likely to face conflicts of interest with investee companies than do 
private sector funds. 
 
A particular feature of these pension plans is the tendency to develop a long-term perspective 
regarding investments, emanating from having significantly predictable time horizons for their 
outflows to plan participants (Brown, 1998; Monks and Minow, 1996). This is reflected in their 
ability to keep a lower rate of asset turnover, and holding their stock longer than other 
institutional investors (Brancato, 1995). There is also evidence of public pension fund managers 
pursuing social performance in addition to financial returns (Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Romano, 1993).  
 
These characteristics imply that public pension plans should be among the most activist of 
institutional investors. Their frequently large size, mixed performance expectations (both long-
run and short-run), larger proportion of equity investment, relative freedom from regulation, 
external management, and retention of proxy voting rights all support the expectation of high 
levels of activism. Support for this prediction comes from a large collection of anecdotal 
evidence, which suggests that public fund managers have been more activist with corporate 
executives in pressing for governance and broadly defined performance improvements than any 
other type of institutional investor (Useem et al., 1993). 
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However, specific institutional fund arrangements may reduce the propensity to intervene. 
Stapledon (1996) reports that the institutional structures of shareholders may result in difficulties 
in exercising these voting rights. He notes in particular that pension fund trustees usually appoint 
one or more fund managers to manage all or part of their funds’ assets. The assets are in turn 
held in a bare trust by custodians, with shares frequently being registered in the name of a 
nominee company of the custodian. Although the custodian is obliged to follow the directions of 
the pension fund trustee, or others specified by the trustees, in the exercise of the voting rights, 
the custodian is the registered holder of the shares and as such receives notices of AGMs, 
documents relating to voting, etc. 
 
Stapledon (1996) reports that pension fund trustees differ in their voting policies for investments 
held in managed funds. First, pension fund trustees may delegate the voting rights to fund 
managers. Second, pension fund trustees may retain the voting rights and so fund managers must 
therefore either obtain approval for voting the shares or follow the directions of the trustees. 
Finally, pension fund trustees may delegate voting rights to fund managers but require that they 
be consulted on contentious issues. 
 
These institutional arrangements may create difficulties. First there may be delays caused by the 
necessity for the custodian to forward the notices and documents that it receives from portfolio 
companies. Second, there may be delays where fund managers are required to either consult or 
obtain the approval of pension fund trustees before exercising the voting rights. Finally, should 
the pension fund or the fund manager be regarded as the potentially activist investor where the 
trustees delegate voting rights to fund managers? Although pension fund trustees usually have a 
long time horizon, the time horizons of fund managers may be short. Myners (2001) notes 
suggestions that fund managers may adopt short-term horizons because of the pressures created 
by the regular, often quarterly, meetings with trustees. Although trustees and their advisers report 
that managers would not usually be dismissed as a consequence of poor performance over one 
quarter, he concludes: 
  
“If clients are – as at present – extremely vague about the time horizons over which 
managers’ performance will be judged, managers will, perfectly rationally, assume that 
they could be dismissed after any quarter’s performance. This has the potential to 
encourage managers to adopt an investment approach which does not reflect either 
their clients’ wishes or their long-term interests” (p. 10). 
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The incentives for fund managers to engage in interventionist activities may therefore be 
different from those of pension fund trustees. 
 
Box III: Engagement Programme at TIAA-CREF’s: A Case Study 
Carleton et al. (1998) studied the correspondence of one major 
institution, the Teachers Insurance Annuity Association-College 
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) with its various targeted firms. 
This correspondence provides the evidence on the negotiation process 
between financial institutions and firms over governance issues. 
TIAA-CREF has been involved in corporate governance activism through 
the filing of proxy resolutions5 since the 1987 proxy season.  
TIAA-CREF's stated policy has been to select targets each year based 
on the following criteria: that CREF has a substantial position in the 
company, that institutions hold a large proportion of its shares, and that 
the company does not follow the governance procedures that TIAA-CREF 
endorses. 
Carleton et al.’s evidence suggests that TIAA-CREF is generally able 
to reach agreements with the corporations it contacts. Of the 45 
firms contacted by TIAA-CREF during the period from 1992 to 
1996, 32 (71 per cent) reached an agreement prior to TIAA-CREF's 
proxy resolution being voted, and 13 (29 per cent) resisted and had 
TIAA-CREF's resolution voted. Ultimately, TIAA-CREF reached 
agreements with 42of the 43 firms that were not acquired during 
the course of negotiations ( 97 .7  per cent). It achieved this high 
percentage despite obtaining a majority vote in only one case. 
They also document that the changes requested by TIAA-CREF 
were, in most cases, made by the firms. All of the seven firms 
targeted by TIAA-CREF for confidential voting have instituted 
confidential voting. At least 12  of the 16  firms targeted for ‘blank check 
preferred’ passed resolutions limiting the use of blank check preferred 
stock as an anti-takeover device. Of the 18 firms targeted for 
                                                
5 Proxy resolutions are those made by institutions/funds on behalf of all their members to accept or reject company 
proposals. 
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board diversity that were not acquired during negotiations, 17  
placed new women or minorities on their board by June 1997.   
 
2.2.  Private Pension Plans 
 
Private pension funds comprise funds to cover the costs of retirement pensions in the private 
sector, whether final salary or money purchase schemes. In contrast to public plans, private 
pension plans present a more mixed profile. They are generally of small to medium size (Pensions 
& Investments, 2000), and their predictable, long-term obligations give them a long time horizon 
for their investments (Brown, 1998; Monks and Minow, 1996). However, the performance 
expectations of private pension funds have traditionally been purely financial, although their 
managers’ desire to actively pursue even those interests may or may not be affected by market 
pressures. 
 
US private pension funds have an average of 38 per cent of their assets invested directly in 
equities, as well as some equity investments made indirectly through mutual funds and insurance 
contracts (US Census Bureau, 2000). UK private pension funds, on the other hand, hold a far 
larger portfolio weight in equities and a lower weight in bonds than do their US or continental 
European counterparts (Black, Lehmann and Timmermann, 2002). Because of these large 
holdings in equity (O’Barr and Conley, 1992), they often engage in a higher level of active raiding 
(i.e. actively participate in general shareholder meetings) than do more indexed public fund 
managers (Brancato, 1995). Private plans also tend towards a mix of internal and external fund 
management (Barr, 1998). Pension funds have also become more active in the U.K. marketplace, 
shifting from one money manager for all the plan's assets to multiple specialist managers. 
 
Plan sponsors have become increasingly likely to make changes, leading to more turnover in 
managers hired by pension plans (Shahnaz, 2004). Plan sponsors have been creating new 
allocations, closing existing portfolios and/or changing portfolio managers. The number of 
pension funds that added, terminated or replaced managers rose to 29 per cent in 2003, from 25 
per cent the previous year. The number of private pension funds that shifted to multiple 
managers from a single manager increased to 61 per cent, up from 53 per cent. 
 
Certain institutional features of the UK pension fund industry affect its behaviour in important 
ways. First, UK pension fund managers face perhaps the smallest set of externally imposed 
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restrictions on their investment behaviour. For example, managers are largely unconstrained in 
their investment decisions by trustee sponsors who do not interfere in day-to-day operations. 
Unlike their US counterparts, UK fund managers face no substantive regulatory controls or real 
threat of litigation against imprudent investment behaviour. The industry is much more highly 
concentrated in the UK than in the US, there is a smaller range of alternative investment styles, 
and relative performance evaluation at both the individual fund-manager and fund-management-
house levels has a more significant impact on investment strategies and outcomes. 
 
Given these constraints, private funds’ long time horizon is the only variable suggesting the 
opportunity for high levels of engagement, while their purely financial performance expectation 
supports a low level of engagement activity. Therefore, the overall prediction for single employer 
private pension funds would be only a moderate tendency towards engagement. 
 
2.3.  Mutual Funds/Unit Trusts 
 
A mutual fund is a company that pools money from many investors and invests the money in 
stocks, bonds, short-term money-market instruments, or other securities. A unit trust typically 
issues redeemable securities (or ‘units’), like a mutual fund, which means that the unit trust will 
buy back an investor’s ‘units,’ at the investor’s request, at their approximate net asset value (or 
NAV) (SEC, 2004). Mutual funds/unit trusts present a very different profile from their pension 
plan peers. Although several very large mutual funds exist, most of these funds are small by 
pension fund standards. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that there is a convex relationship in 
the mutual fund industry between performance and fund size, suggesting increasing returns to 
scale (Kaplan and Schoar, 2003). Their heightened liquidity requirements frequently make mutual 
funds resort to more momentum trading (e.g. buy or sell share more quickly by following the 
current trends in trading) than other institutional investors (Jones, Lee, and Tompkins, 1997), 
thus resulting in shorter time horizons (Brancato, 1995). Some very specialised funds exhibit a 
purely financial interest in portfolio firms, although social responsibility funds are a growing 
industry segment (Davis and Trent, 1993). 
 
Mutual funds now provide private investors with access to global investment opportunities on a 
par with large institutional investors. As a long-term investment and savings vehicle they also have 
a reasonable record of delivering positive returns. Today, a wide range of mutual funds is 
available to private investors covering local, regional and global equity and debt markets. With the 
exception of a few balanced equity and bond funds, virtually all of the assets of mutual funds that 
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are classified as institutional investments are dedicated to equity investments. As a result, most asset 
managers' teams may enjoy wide discretion over their engagement work, in contrast to pension 
funds where they tend to work to a plan approved in advance by trustees. 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that mutual fund managers have generally displayed their displeasure 
with under performing firms by exercising ‘exit’ rather than an activist ‘voice’ (Davis and 
Thompson, 1994). However, mutual fund complexes have been responding to corporate 
governance concerns by throwing their weight around through shareholder resolutions and proxy 
votes. One proposal that has received official support in the UK is to make mutual funds disclose 
their voting records and policies. The idea is to make information available to allow investors to 
discover if their mutual fund company had voted against their interests. The UK Government is 
considering the future of the ordinary-business exception, a rule that bars shareholder resolutions 
on supposedly everyday matters. Scrapping it would allow investors to express their views on 
subjects such as stock options and consulting work by auditors.  
 
Mutual funds’ short time horizon may lead to low level of engagement, but their lack of 
sensitivity to market pressures and regulation reduces the constraints placed on their actions. 
Further, their high proportion of equity investment also favours high levels of activism. 
 
2.4.  Insurance Companies  
 
Insurance companies’ funds are provided by premia paid by clients insuring against a wide range 
of risks, including risks to property, health and personal well-being.  Perhaps because they 
currently hold only 10.7 per cent of the equities held by institutions, insurance companies’ role as 
investors has received little attention. However, their equity holdings are increasing rapidly, 
suggesting that they deserve careful examination. Like private pension funds, the insurance 
industry includes both very large firms and hundreds of smaller ones. Given their emphasis on 
bonds and mortgages as long-term investments, insurance companies may tend to view equity 
investments as having a relatively short-term horizon, evidenced by their somewhat higher equity 
asset turnover relative to pension plans (Eng, 1999). However, they may take a long term view of 
their investment goals since the pattern of claims against them is both fairly predictable and long-
term (Black and Coffee, 1994). 
 
Insurance company regulations leave sufficient scope for larger insurers and insurers with a high 
free asset ratio to invest in venture capital and private equity. However, the admissibility limits set 
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out in the regulations act as a disincentive for smaller insurers and insurers with a low free asset 
ratio (the market value of an insurance company's assets minus its policy liabilities) to invest in 
the asset class at an appropriate level of diversification. For these insurers, funds-of-funds would 
represent a substantially less risky way to participate in the asset class, although this option 
becomes far less attractive when calculating tax liabilities. Insurance companies usually run a 
common investment activity for both their life insurance and pensions business. Since smaller 
pension schemes increasingly outsource their investment management to insurers, the 
complications that arise during tax computations spread into areas that are not liable to taxation 
on capital gains. 
 
2.5. Banks 
 
Currently banks account for only a fraction of institutional equity holdings. Because their equity 
investing is legally restricted to their trust function (Kidwell et al., 1993), their overall fund size is 
relatively small. Banks also tend to adopt a short-term perspective concerning their equity 
investments, as indicated by their high asset turnover, which is second only to that of mutual 
funds (Eng, 1999). Among the various financial institutions, banks have been notably 
conservative in interpreting their fiduciary responsibility, suggesting that they focus exclusively on 
financial performance (Del Guercio, 1996). Although banks’ relative freedom from legal 
restraints and their large proportion of trust assets dedicated to equity encourage engagement, 
their options are limited because of the small size of their holdings overall.  
 
2.6.  Private Equity Funds 
 
Private equity funds are funds raised for investments not publicly traded [i.e. not listed on the 
stock exchange]. Although growing rapidly, they represent only a relatively small proportion of 
capital invested (see above, page 46).  However, they have a particularly strong presence in high-
risk sectors.  Kaplan and Schoar (2003) investigated performance persistence and the relation of 
fund performance to capital flows, fund size, and overall fund survival. They found that 
performance increases with fund size and partnership experience. They also found that funds 
raised in boom times and firms that are started in boom times are less likely to raise a follow-on 
fund, suggesting that these funds do not perform well enough. They also conjecture that better-
performing funds have better governance structures, thus highlighting the need for more research 
in this area. 
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 Post Investment Monitoring and Intervention: Investors in private equity firms demand a high rate of 
return, and the structure of limited partnerships provides general partners with incentives to meet 
these demands (see above, page 42). The way in which private equity investments are structured 
both provides managers of portfolio companies with incentives to meet the expected high 
returns, and allows general partners to monitor and intervene in portfolio companies. There is 
some uncertainty about the extent to which private equity firms do in fact intervene in companies 
in order to obtain superior returns. Baum and Silverman (2003) suggest that in the case of start-
up companies, private equity firms act as both scouts in identifying companies with potential, and 
coaches who assist in realising that potential. The high returns may be secured through the 
selection of companies in which to invest, and/or through active post-investment involvement. 
Baum and Silverman indicate that the research literature clearly supports the view that private 
equity firms are both expert scouts and coaches, but also that it is unclear which of these roles is 
most important in adding value. Nevertheless, it is clear that they take a long-term view in their 
investment goals. 
 
The ways private equity firms can monitor and exert control over portfolio companies are 
described by Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995). These include covenants that give private equity 
firms the right to inspect accounting and other company records, to receive timely accounting 
and operating information, and which require private equity firm approval for certain decisions. 
 
In addition to using the contractual relationships between the private equity firm and the 
portfolio company and its managers, private equity firms may also exert control over portfolio 
companies by staging funding. Cuny and Talmor (2003) identify two methods that are commonly 
used, especially with start-up companies. In the first, milestone financing, private equity firms are 
committed to provide additional funds subject to companies meeting certain criteria; whereas in 
the second, round financing, managers request additional funding. Not only does the use of staged 
funding provide private equity firms with an abandonment option, it also offers incentives for 
managers and provides private equity firms opportunities for monitoring and control. Cuny and 
Talmor identify situations where milestone financing or round financing is preferred. They find, 
for example, that milestone financing is preferred when the role of the private equity firm is more 
important than that of managers. 
 
The way in which the private equity deal is structured, together with the use of staged funding, 
both provides incentives to managers and allows the general partners of private equity firms to 
monitor and control portfolio companies. Incentives are provided through the financial 
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structures of portfolio companies, in which managers own part of the equity, the existence of 
liquidation rights held by private equity firms, and the use of staged funding. As well as providing 
managers with incentives, and private equity firms with the ability to control, rights to liquidate 
their interests in portfolio companies and the use of staged funding also provide private equity 
with abandonment options on their investments. Finally, voting rights, rights to board 
representation and covenants incorporated in the agreements between portfolio companies and 
private equity firms, allow general partners to monitor and control the activities of portfolio 
companies. 
 
The literature on post investment monitoring and involvement distinguishes between the degree 
of involvement by private equity firms in portfolio companies, and the areas in which they are 
involved. Throughout the literature there is evidence that private equity firms differ in their 
approaches to managing their investments. Such differences may reflect the management style of 
general partners, and/or the characteristics of portfolio companies. 
 
Degree of involvement with portfolio companies. Private equity firms differ in the amount of time they 
devote to post investment monitoring and intervention. Elango, Fried, Hisrich and Polonchek 
(1995) identify three levels of involvement: inactive, active advice-giver, and hands-on. Involvement by 
the inactive group is mainly confined to attendance at board meeting. This classification is similar 
to the one of MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian (1988) who found three clusters: laissez faire, 
moderate, and close tracker. Elango, Fried, Hisrich and Polonchek find that the time spend by 
general partners with portfolio companies was on average 6.76 hours per month for the inactive 
group, 12.75 hours per month for active advice-giver group, 35.65 hours per month for the 
hands-on group. They found that these differences are not related to the stage of development of 
the portfolio company; there being high-involvement private equity firms investing in MBOs, and 
low involvement private equity firms investing at the seed stage. A recent survey of private 
equity-funded UK companies with an annual turnover of £20 million to £500 million found that 
21 per cent of management rated the private equity firms as inactive, and a further 26 per cent 
indicated the private equity firms as “relatively inactive”1.  
 
The BVCA (2003) recognises differences between private equity firms in their level of 
involvement. It identifies two broad approaches adopted by private equity firms in the post-
investment period: hands-on and hands-off. Where private equity firms adopt a hands-on, or active, 
approach to managing their investment they become involved as a business partner in the 
                                                
1 Report of a survey commissioned by PPM Ventures (Times 4 February 2004). 
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portfolio company. In many cases they participate through representation on the board, with 
either an executive of the private equity firm or external consultant appointed as a director. The 
BVCA comments that private equity firms are rarely involved in the day-to-day operations of the 
portfolio company. Private equity firms taking a hands-on approach both monitor portfolio firms 
through, for example, reviewing management accounts and board minutes, and through 
involvement in decisions such as the purchase of major capital items, acquisitions and disposals, 
changes in strategic direction, appointment of directors and auditors, and changes in capital 
structure. The alternative hands-off, or passive approach mainly involves monitoring portfolio 
firms, for example through management accounts. Private equity firms taking a hands-off approach 
are, however, likely to become actively involved with the portfolio company under certain 
circumstances such as failure to meet agreed targets or default of payments. We therefore 
conclude that venture capital firms add value by assisting their portfolio companies in 
making sound investment choices. 
 
Private Equity Firm Involvement in Portfolio Companies. There are various ways in which private equity 
firms may engage with portfolio companies. Busenitza, Fiet, and Moesel (2004) suggest that some 
common forms of intervention include: (1) being a member of the portfolio company’s board; (2) 
acting as a sounding board for management; (3) making customer and supplier introductions, (4) 
monitoring operating performance; and (5) assisting with strategic issues.  Such activities are 
indicated in the case studies of investor influence on management practice published separately.. 
 
The rights of private equity firms to nominate directors of portfolio companies is an important 
component of their control rights (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2000). The role of private equity firm 
nominees may, however, extend beyond control. Goodstein, Gautman, and Boeker, (1994) 
identify three functional duties of company boards: (1) networking activities which are to do with 
forming links between the company and its external environment, and securing critical resources; 
(2) monitoring activities which include dealing with internal governance issues, monitoring company 
performance and providing mechanisms to align the interests of management with shareholders; 
and (3) strategy-making activities contributing to the company’s strategic decision-making processes. 
Wijbenga, Postma, Van Witteloostuijn and Zwart (2003) follow this framework in reviewing the 
role of private equity investors in the boards of portfolio companies. First, in relation to 
networking activities, they suggest that there is evidence that the boards of portfolio companies 
(on which general partners usually sit) provide an interface with other investor group members, 
provide industry contacts and contacts with professionals. Private equity firms also assist in 
obtaining alternative equity capital. Second, in relation to monitoring activities, there is evidence 
that the boards of portfolio companies monitor financial performance, monitor operational 
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performance, and evaluate the portfolio company’s strategy and product market opportunities in 
order to develop the new venture’s strategy to changing circumstances. Finally, in relation to 
strategy-making activities, there is evidence that the boards of portfolio companies serve as a 
sounding board, assist in formulating business strategy, assist in dealing with short-term crises or 
problems, and recruit and/or replace managers. 
 
The dismissal of managers, and appointment of replacements, is a mechanism through which 
private equity firms can influence portfolio companies. There is evidence that dismissal follows 
poor performance and opportunism (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Jensen, 1994). The rate of 
dismissal of portfolio company mangers is high. A recent newspaper report suggests that a third 
of the managers of MBOs funded by private equity firms are dismissed2. The same report also 
notes that private equity firms are now acquiring industrial expertise, either by having operating 
partners as well as financial ones, or by hiring industrial experts when required. These operating 
partners and industrial experts are also used as replacement managers. 
 
The extent and method of involvement of private equity firms in portfolio companies is variable. 
There is evidence to suggest that many private equity firms adopt a hands-off approach, 
intervening only when managers are failing to reach agreed targets. For those private equity firms 
that do involve themselves more actively, this appears mainly through influencing company 
strategy and through using their knowledge and contacts to introduce portfolio companies to 
networks of suppliers and customers, professionals and alternative sources of finance. Private 
equity firms also focus on the quality of management and replace unsuitable managers. 
 
It has been argued that alliance partners (i.e. private equity firms and portfolio companies) can 
generate rents by developing superior interfirm knowledge-sharing routines (Dyer and Singh 
1998). For example, the venture's financial officer reporting to venture capitalists and other board 
members about the accomplishment of pre-set performance targets. Both partners therefore 
generate rents through exchange of knowledge valuable to one another (Dyer and Singh 1998). 
Frequent interactions between the parties may enhance access to each other's knowledge base and 
increase the capability of processing complex knowledge. Therefore, knowledge sharing between 
venture capitalist and entrepreneur will stimulate a greater understanding between the parties, and 
ultimately enhance the potential for the creation of relational rents. Therefore, we conclude that 
the greater the knowledge-sharing routines in venture capitalist-entrepreneur dyads, the greater 
the creation of relational rents. 
                                                
2 John Gapper, The private pressures of hands-on management Financial Times 6 April 2004. 
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 2.7 Summary of the Main Factors that Affect Investor Engagement 
 
We briefly describe below relevant constraints that we believe offer the most power in explaining 
investor engagement. 
 
Fund S ze: The overall size of the fund is clearly a relevant constraint. Larger funds will have 
both more resources and more expertise to engage in activism than smaller funds. 
i
 
Investment Time Horizon: Investors with significantly predictable, long-term outflows to 
beneficiaries have the potential to develop a long-term perspective regarding their investments. 
 
Performance Expectations: Investors may intend to increase investment returns through 
promoting better management practices (e.g. high quality standards or customer service as part of 
competitive strategy), which may lead to them adopting broader than purely financial measures of 
company performance. 
 
Proportion Invested in Equity: It is likely that investors with a larger percentage of equity in 
their asset mix will engage in more activism than investors with a smaller percentage of equity in 
their asset mix. 
 
Legal Restraints: Institutional investors have legal fiduciary responsibilities to their funds’ 
beneficiaries in their role as financial intermediaries. These responsibilities include exercise of 
trust law regarding duty of care and duty of loyalty. Such restraints may discourage or, in certain 
circumstances encourage, engagement.  For example, one approach that could be taken by a 
pension fund adopting a policy of socially and/or environmentally responsible investment 
strategy is to screen investments and either exclude companies with undesirable characteristics, or 
form a portfolio of companies with those features deemed to be desirable.  However, such a 
screening approach, by excluding companies from, or overweighting in the investment portfolio, 
reduces the benefits of diversification in reducing risk.  Pension fund trustees may therefore wish 
to retain the benefits of full diversification by including those companies that it views as having 
undesirable features in its investment portfolio, and then engage with such companies. 
 
Defined-Benefit/Contribution: In defined-benefit retirement plans the fund sponsor promises 
beneficiaries a given annuity at retirement, so investment risk is borne by the fund sponsor. In 
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defined-contribution plans no fixed amount is guaranteed by the sponsor, so the investment risk 
is shifted to beneficiaries. Funds covering defined benefit plans therefore have greater incentives 
to intervene. 
 
Active/Passive Investing: Under active management, securities in the portfolio and other 
potential securities are regularly evaluated, and managers make buy-or-sell decisions based on 
current and projected future performance. Under passive management, part or all of the portfolio 
is ‘indexed’ to emulate a broad financial market through construction of a portfolio that matches 
the characteristics of a market index, such as the FTSE100. The degree to which funds are 
‘actively’ or ‘passively’ managed can affect their tendency towards engagement. 
 
Internal/External Management: A pension plan portfolio, in particular, may be managed 
internally by the fund sponsor, or some or all of it may be outsourced to mutual funds, insurance 
companies, or bank trusts. Internally managed funds are more likely to have high levels of 
engagement. 
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Table 6: Applying the Engagement Model 
Investor 
Characteristics  
Public 
Pen. 
Funds 
 
Private 
Pen. 
Funds 
 
Mutual 
Funds 
 
 
Insurance 
Comp. 
 
 
Banks 
 
 
 
Private 
Equity 
Firms 
 
Fund size H M M M L L 
Investment time 
horizon 
H H L L L H 
Performance 
expectations 
H L M L L H 
Proportion invested 
in equity 
H M M L H M? H 
Legal restraints H M M L H L 
Defined 
benefit/contributio
n 
H M N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Active/passive 
investing 
H M M L M L 
Internal/external 
management 
H M N/A L L L 
Engagement model 
suggests 
High 
engage. 
Moder. 
engage.
Moder. 
engage. 
Low 
engage. 
Low 
engage. 
High 
engage.
Notes: H: high, M: mixed, L: low 
 
Organisation Fit and VC Firms 
 
Theory posits that organising external support in ways that fit the implementation requirements of 
a company’s business strategy enhances performance. Drawing on agency theory approaches in 
management, we address these problems by assessing how venture capital organisation fit with 
portfolio company business strategy in a way that enables the implementation of a particular 
strategy, e.g. skill development. We suggest that VC organisation fit with particular portfolio 
company strategies is associated with improved effectiveness in various strategic types. 
 
Surprisingly, the VC literature does not address how problems with VC support can be solved. 
However, research developments in organisation theory (e.g., Powell 1992; Venkatraman and 
Prescott 1990) and strategic management (e.g., Doty, Glick, and Huber 1993; Ketchen et al. 1997) 
 -52-
provide approaches appropriate for assessing such complex theoretical relationships. In this 
report, we draw on these developments to build and empirically assess a conceptual model that 
links the degree to which VC activities are organised in ways that enable portfolio company 
business strategy implementation with improved performance outcomes. 
 
Defining and Assessing Organisation Fit with Business Strategy  
 
Strategic management scholars have used many different terms - including ‘match’, ‘alignment’, 
‘congruence’, ‘complementary’, and ‘consistency’ - to denote holistic relationships between 
multidimensional phenomena such as organisation and business strategy. These terms are often 
used interchangeably, although each of these terms can connote different meanings and 
interpretations. For example, configuration theory attempts to specify and assess relationships 
involved in creating fit among different sets of variables. Therefore, the term can be defined in 
several ways, each of which has specific implications for how relationships between different 
management variables are conceptualized and tested (Powell 1992; Venkatraman and Camillus 
1984).  
 
A VC approach views fit between organisation and strategy in terms of the degree to which the 
organisational characteristics of a VC firm differ in respect of a particular strategy 
implementation: organisational characteristics that fit with the implementation requirements of a 
particular portfolio company strategy produce better performance.  
 
Configurational Elements of Marketing Organisation Fit with Business Strategy  
 
Two major constructs that are relevant to understanding and assessing VC organization fit with 
portfolio company strategy are:  
 
VC organisational characteristics; and portfolio company’s strategic type. VC organisation fit 
pertains to the planned patterns of organisational adaptation to the portfolio company needs 
through which a VC firm seeks to provide necessary support. VCs proactively seek and exploit 
new market opportunities and often experiment with responses to changing market trends. They 
aggressively compete on innovation, seeking first-mover advantages from developing new 
offerings and pioneering new markets. In contrast, other investors generally focus more narrowly 
on maintaining a secure position in existing product-markets. They often compete through 
quality-based investments that offer efficiency related advantages, rarely pioneering the 
development of new markets or products. Rather less aggressively, they balance a focus on 
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securing their position in existing core markets with incremental moves into new product 
markets. They compete by balancing investments in creating differentiation-based advantages 
with operating efficiency. 
 
VC's organisational characteristics are the many important structural and task characteristics that 
together constitute the way support activities are organized within the business. The structural 
characteristics of the VC organisation pertain to how support activities and related decision-making 
authority are arranged.  
 
Although the literature identifies several different structural characteristics of organisation, three 
have been viewed as particularly important in previous research on organisational fit:  
 
organisational capabilities regarding the VC's ability to perform common advisory work routines 
through which available advice is parted to the portfolio company; 
 
de-centralisation regarding the diffusion of decision-making authority at higher levels of the 
business's hierarchy (e.g., Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993); 
and  
 
specialization, which is the extent to which VC activities are narrowly divided into unique 
elements that are performed by those with specialized knowledge (e.g., Walker and Ruekert 1987). 
 
Together, these organisational characteristics indicate the ability of the VC organisation to 
perform necessary support activities and the degree to which organisational fit is needed to 
accomplish them. 
 
VC Organisation Fit with Strategic Type and Performance  
 
Fit between the organisational characteristics of a VC firm and its portfolio company type is 
viewed as a desirable state that leads to superior performance (e.g., Miles and Snow 1994; Porter 
1996). Strategic management theory suggests that this is also true of fit between VC organisation 
characteristics and portfolio company strategic type. For example, the literature indicates that the 
activities needed to implement a high skill development strategy requires VC organisations with 
different configurations of structural and task characteristics (e.g., Matsuno and Mentzer 2000; 
McKee, Varadarajan, and Pride 1989; Walker and Ruekert 1987). Therefore, theory suggests that 
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organising advisory activities in ways that fit the portfolio business's strategy requirement is an 
important driver of performance outcomes (e.g., Walker and Ruekert 1987). 
 
VC Organisation Fit with Portfolio Company Strategies and Effectiveness  
Therefore, implementing this strategy requires a VC organisation configured to achieve needed 
market-based goals through performance of routine VC activities (e.g., Ruekert and Walker 1987; 
Slater and Narver 1993). Performing such routine activities calls for a VC organisation with a 
highly decentralised but specialised structure and a relatively narrow range of support capabilities. 
By narrowly focusing the deployment of available resources, VC organisations with these 
characteristics may benefit from greater depth in a few key VC specific capabilities. This may be 
leveraged through de-centralized authority structures in the committee form that provide control 
over the focus of future resource deployment and formalized work routines that minimize errors 
in executing required activities. Organising VC activities in this way should enable a firm 
implementing a VC support strategy to achieve superior VC effectiveness. 
 
New VC ventures focus on entering unfamiliar new markets and attaining product innovation-
related advantages. Therefore, achieving required development goals involves performing many 
complex VC activities. Accomplishing these activities ideally requires decentralized, and informal 
organisational structures (i.e. committee form) and a range of strong specialised capabilities. In 
implementing a pro-active VC support strategy, such organisational characteristics should 
enhance effectiveness because they empower portfolio companies with access to wide-ranging 
capabilities and skill support activities and provide the decision-making freedom and work 
routine flexibility to use their resources to provide timely and innovative responses in dynamic 
portfolio company product-markets. 
 
VCs pursuing pro-active support strategies operate in a range of new markets and seek to attain 
both cost and differentiation-based advantages. Therefore, VC firms organisations that are able to 
achieve needed portfolio company development goals by performing a particularly wide and 
dynamic range of support activities. VC organisations ideal for the advisory role should therefore 
have high levels of sector specialization with semi-formalized and de-centralized structures. Such 
specialization and capability characteristics enable businesses implementing a development 
support strategy to respond quickly to the complex requirements of unfamiliar markets – in 
which portfolio companies are operating. At the same time, semi-formalization and de-
centralization allow less bureaucratic control over the new market opportunities pursued. VC 
organisations with such ideal characteristics should enable the implementation of active support 
strategies in a way that produces superior portfolio company effectiveness. 
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 In summary, we expect a VC firm's effectiveness to be greater when its organisation 
characteristics fit the implementation requirements of the portfolio company business strategies in 
ways that enable specific development goals to be achieved. 
 
From a methodological perspective, our study demonstrates the utility of ‘fit’ or complementary 
approaches in assessing fit-performance relationships in VC theory. Although these approaches 
have been adopted in the organisation theory and strategic management fields, they have not been 
used previously in the VC literature. These approaches enable researchers to assess fit in a way 
that is consistent with the multidimensional and holistic perspectives used in theorizing about 
portfolio company strategy. By enabling multiple variables to be assessed simultaneously, this 
approach also enables researchers to more closely represent the complex constructs and multiple 
contingencies faced by managers in the ‘real world’.  
 
From a managerial perspective, our findings highlight the need for managers to understand the 
multiple variables that are important characteristics of the way VC support activities are arranged 
and the ways they must be configured to fit the implementation requirements of the portfolio 
company's business strategy. In designing VC organisations to fit with portfolio company business 
strategy, our research indicates that managers should not seek a single VC organization template 
that will be both effective and efficient across different strategic types (see Aufreiter, George, and 
Lempres 1996; Ruekert, Walker, and Roering 1985). Rather, our findings suggest that managers 
should be guided by the skill needs of its portfolio companies. 
 
The relationships between the multiple variables that constitute the VC organisation are a 
theoretically interesting and managerially difficult issue on which there has been little theoretical 
or empirical work. Having demonstrated the performance consequences of fit between VC 
organisation characteristics and portfolio company business strategy, it is also important to gain 
an understanding of how to coalign the multiple characteristics of VC organisations to achieve 
such fit. Managers need to understand how the various ‘levers’ of VC organisation are connected 
to one another if they are to successfully configure VC organisations capable of executing the 
portfolio company's business strategy in ways that deliver desired performance outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We demonstrate that by drawing on conceptualizations as developed in our research and 
methodological tools, many of these fit- performance relationships can be empirically assessed in 
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ways that match their multidimensional conceptualization. As an example, our results indicate 
that organising VC activities in ways that fit portfolio company's strategy type can form a 
significant source of competitive advantage. Given the importance of fit-performance 
relationships in strategic management theory and managers' interest in identifying such valuable 
sources of competitive advantage, additional studies of this type are clearly needed to enhance 
VC strategy scholars' contribution to theory development and practice. 
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3.  Forms of  Engagement 
 
The aim of this section is to examine how investors carry out their engagement activities. It also 
discusses specific conventions or rules that might emerge to govern investor relations. To address 
this question it places investor relations in the context of corporate governance and shareholder 
activism literature. There are three main ways in which investors can perform their governance 
function: 
 
(i) they can exercise their voting rights at general meetings; 
(ii) they can affect their relationships through information transfer, meetings and 
informal discussions with managers; and  
(iii) they can attach conditions to further injection of funds. 
 
Whether formalised or not, most active investors operate some form of ‘ladder of escalation’ 
approach for engagement with individual companies, albeit invariably applied with flexibility. 
 
Black (1998) describes the methods of intervention available to institutional investors in the US 
as either presenting, or threatening to present, a resolution at a company’s annual general meeting, 
and voting at meetings, or attempting to influence management with a view to changing 
management itself or company strategy (‘jawboning’). Opler and Sokobin (1995) refer to the 
former as being public methods of intervention; and the latter as private. Gillan and Starks (2000) 
identify a further type of intervention which is inclusion of a company in a published focus list, a 
list of companies that are identified by an institutional investors as being targeted for intervention. 
In the UK the Combined Code (2003) states that institutional shareholders have a responsibility 
to make considered use of their votes, and to enter into a dialogue with companies based on the 
mutual understanding of objectives.  
 
The organisational arrangements for monitoring and intervention are more complex. The 
complexity of action by UK institutional investors is described by Stapledon (1996). He identifies 
four types of involvement, defined in terms of whether the action is by the institutional 
shareholder (direct) or through a collective vehicle such as the Institutional Shareholders’ 
Committee (indirect), and in terms of whether the action is industry-wide or firm specific. First, 
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direct industry-wide monitoring is where a few UK institutions conduct industry-wide actions on 
issues such as disclosure of treasury policy and directors service contracts. Second, Stapledon 
suggests that when considering direct firm-level monitoring it is necessary to distinguish between 
direct actions performed regularly and those that follow extraordinary circumstances. Included in 
the former are exercising voting rights, analysis of information about the company, and regular 
meeting and dialogue with management. Extraordinary action may be by an institution alone or 
jointly with other institutional investors. This action may be taken to replace under performing, 
or otherwise unacceptable, management. It is suggested that such action is most effective when 
undertaken jointly by a small group of three or four institutions who between them have at least 
20 – 30 per cent of the equity. Third, indirect industry-wide monitoring is industry-wide action by 
institutional investors and has mainly been carried out indirectly through collective vehicles who 
have promoted best practice in a number of areas including pre-emption rights, share schemes, 
transparency and disclosure. Finally, two types of indirect firm-level monitoring can be identified: 
collective-action vehicles and non-executive directors. Industry groups1 form ‘case committees’ 
of the main institutional investors in an individual company to deal with problems, or the 
secretary of Investment Committee of the ABI or NAPF may communicate with member 
institutions holding large blocks and intervene with the company. Indirect firm level monitoring 
may also be through ‘institutional’ non-executive directors, who are either fund managers or 
persons selected by fund managers. From this it would seem that much of the involvement of 
institutional investors with companies is carried out in private. 
 
The literature is examined here under three headings: (1) the characteristics of companies that are 
targeted by institutional investors; (2) issues on which resolutions are proposed and the 
determinants of voting outcome; and (3) specific institutional fund arrangements. 
 
3.1.  Characteristics of Targeted Companies 
 
Institutional investors each have their own criteria for intervening in companies, and their criteria 
may change over time. For example, Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) note that the: “... the 
criteria for targeting vary dramatically with institutions. Some institutions (e.g., the Colorado 
Public Employees Retirement System) have targeted firms based solely on performance; others, 
such as TIAA-CREF, target firms based on specific governance objectives. Other activist 
                                                
1 The Association of British Insurers (ABI), National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), Association of 
Investment Trust Companies (AITC) and the Investment Management Association (IMA). 
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pension funds (e.g. CalPERS) have used a combination of governance issues and performance 
measures in their targeting criteria.” (p. 1338). As noted below, CalPERS initially solely used 
corporate governance criteria in its selection. Given differences in criteria used by institutional 
investors, and the possible change in these criteria over time, it is not surprising that differences 
are to be found in the empirical literature. 
Studies of the characteristics of companies targeted by shareholders examine one or more of the 
following: (1) share price performance in the period before targeting; (2) accounting measures of 
performance in the pre-targeting period; and (3) ownership structure. Opler and Sokobin (1995) 
find that companies selected for the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) focus list exhibit 
poor share price performance relative to the S&P 500, other firms in the same industry and 
matched companies in the period prior to inclusion in the list. They note that the CII use share 
price performance as a selection criterion. M.P. Smith (1996) in a study of companies targeted by 
CalPERS, finds negative returns in the pre-targeting period. Wahal (1996) also finds that 
companies under perform the market in the two years prior to targeting, but also they come from 
industries that also under perform the market. Finally, Bizjak and Marquette (1998) find that 
firms with shareholder proposals to rescind poison pills have a significantly lower three-year 
abnormal return relative to a value weighted index. On the other hand, Karpoff, Malatesta, and 
Walkling (1996), and Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) in a study of companies targeted by 
TIAA-CREF, do not find differences in pre-targeting performance. 
 
A number of accounting measures have been used to identify performance differences prior to 
targeting. Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) find that companies receiving proposals have 
lower market-to-book ratios, operating returns to sales, and recent sales growth than control 
companies.  Bizjak and Marquette (1998), using operating cash flow as a performance measure, 
find evidence of poorer performance in targeted firms. However, Opler and Sokobin (1995), also 
using this measure, do not find much evidence of poorer performance prior to inclusion in the 
CII focus list. Wahal (1996) shows that targeted companies have lower return on assets for two 
years and one year prior to targeting. 
 
Finally, Bizjak and Marquette (1998) and Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) find lower levels 
of insider ownership (i.e. stocks owned by employee managers; outside ownership involves 
investor owners with no direct links to the company) in targeted companies, although Karpoff, 
Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) do not find the lower levels to be statistically significant. Karpoff, 
Malatesta, and Walkling, and Bizjak and Marquette report higher concentrations of institutional 
ownership in targeted companies, but Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach do not find this difference. 
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The general picture that emerges is of targeted firms having poorer pre-targeted performance, 
measured both in terms of share price performance and using accounting numbers. They also 
have an ownership structure characterised by lower insider, and greater concentration of 
institutional, ownership. Differences between studies may arise through sample selection and the 
time periods studied. 
 
3.2.  Shareholder Proposals 
 
Although the issues on which shareholder proposals are initiated are grouped slightly differently 
in the literature, the classification adopted by Gillan and Starks (2000) is representative. They 
classify proposals into issues related to anti-takeover devices. These include proposals for the 
repeal of classified boards6, elimination of poison pills7 and golden parachutes8, and prohibition 
of greenmail payment9.  
  
1. Voting issues. These are proposals on types of voting arrangements such as cumulative 
voting10 and confidential voting11. 
2. Board and committee independence issues. These include proposals on director ownership, 
increase in board independence, limit on director terms, and on director compensation. 
3. Other issues. The main issue in this category is executive compensation.  
 
The majority of the proposals have to do with issues relating to anti-takeover defences, in 
particular repeal of classified boards and elimination of poison pills, with voting issues and with 
                                                
6 A board structure in which there are three classes of director, with only one class of director standing for election 
each year.  This structure is seen as reducing directors’ accountability to shareholders and as entrenching poor and 
mediocre boards. 
7 An anti-takeover tactic in which a company issues securities (such as warrants or preferred shares) that give its 
shareholders the right to purchase shares of the company, or the acquiring company, in the event of a takeover.  The 
purpose of the poison pill is to inhibit a takeover by making it too expensive. 
8 An element of an executive’s employment contract that specifies that (s)he will receive a large payment in the event 
that the employment is terminated.  The event which triggers the golden parachutes is often a takeover of the 
company and subsequent termination of employment. 
9 A greenmail payment is made when an investor acquires a large block of shares in the target company and, in order 
to eliminate the threat posed by the investor (frequently the threat of a takeover), the board negotiates to repurchase 
the shares at a price above that paid by the investor and usually a premium above market price. 
10 A method of voting in which a shareholder may cast votes equal to the number of shares owned times the number 
of directors to be elected.  The votes may be cast for only one director or for any combination of directors.  It is 
seen as a voting system that gives minority shareholders more power by allowing them to cast all their board of 
director votes in favour of a single candidate. 
11 A system of voting that maintains the anonymity of the voting decisions of individual shareholders.  Promoters of 
confidential voting argue that some shareholders have conflicts of interest which, under a normal voting system, 
would prevent them from voting against management, even where this would maximize the value of their 
investment.  Confidential voting is seen as enabling such investors to vote in a way that reflects their best interests.  
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executive compensation. This is consistent with the findings of Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), 
Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) and Wahal (1996). Chidambara and Woidtke (1999) 
report that proposals are more likely to be withdrawn if hostile resolutions are sponsored by 
institutional investors or by co-ordinated groups. The withdrawal of proposals is seen as an 
indication of strength in negotiating with management, since it involves weakening anti-takeover 
measures and thus the managers’ position in the competition for corporate control. There are a 
number of studies on the factors influencing the outcome of votes. First, the type of issue that is 
being voted upon. Wahal (1996) finds that there is a significantly higher level of support for 
proposals related to takeover defences than to governance issues. Second, a range of factors 
associated with the ownership structure of the targeted company determine voting outcome. 
Gordon and Pound (1993) report that voting depends on ownership by insiders, institutions, 
outside blockholders and outside directors who are blockholders, and Gillan (2002) finds that 
votes cast in favour of management are reduced by the presence of institutional shareholders. 
Finally, there are differences depending on which institutional investor targeted the company 
(Wahal, 1996). 
 
Overall, the presentation of shareholder proposals reflects a break-down in normal relations 
between investors and managers, and is unlikely to be a frequently used mechanism in investor 
engagement. 
 
3.3.  Norms and Standards in Investor Engagement  
 
When engagement commences, institutional managers build on a significant body of experience 
in investor monitoring behaviour directed at financial performance and corporate governance 
(Useem, 1996). This suggests that engagement standards might be important in the relationship 
between investors and investees. The literature identifies various emerging norms and provides 
some indication of how they might be established as standards to deliver the potential benefits. 
The process of engagement might be helped by norms or standards of behaviour. For instance, 
norms may offer benefits for targeting, coordination and collaboration and leverage. They could 
also support easier coordination and generate beneficial spillover effects. 
 
Common processes for definition, reporting and recording of engagement would enhance 
practitioners’ ability to learn from experience and to identify the practices that make engagement 
effective. For example, although management accounting is usually the domain of the internal 
management of a company, and is developed purely for internal management, control, and 
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decision-making, there is evidence to suggest that venture capital investors will put in place their 
own systems, so that they might gather enough relevant information on which to make future 
funding decisions. 
 
When there are more consistent and transparent processes for identifying targets, the credibility 
of the engagement process will also increase. It will make the distribution of information between 
managers and investors more symmetric, increasing the focus of the investor engagement on the 
same companies. It also offers practical benefit to engagee companies, which currently face a 
multiplicity of potentially inconsistent approaches (Lyster, 2001). 
 
The asset fund managers examine specific company circumstances looking for scope to embed the 
process of change through a long-term relationship. Funds with a sectoral approach generally 
establish a rolling programme to cover all major sectors over a period of years. Funds taking a 
company-led approach are generally critical of the issue-led approach. This is because of the 
difficulties in finding an agreed solution to a given problem. In terms of the issue-led approach, 
some funds may adopt a stakeholder orientation to their targeting, and the others may reflect a 
similar approach, albeit justified by a business case. However, unanimity often exists among the 
asset and pension funds to target `laggards', companies that are behind performance standards 
in their sector.  But sector engagement may begin with learning from leading companies. 
 
3.3.1.  Norms in UK Investor Engagement 
 
Dresner (2002) finds several typical engagement practices from a survey of 13 UK fund managers. 
In particular, advance-planned programmes of engagement with predetermined objectives and a 
formalised approach involving periodic review, strategic planning, research, identified 
performance indicators and an audit trail are commonly practised. A particular development is 
the integration of investor engagement and corporate governance activities among most fund 
managers, with voting strategies communicated to target companies. 
 
Other established or emerging norms include: 
 
High discretion for engagement managers – with little influence by clients; 
Confidentiality at least while engagement is ongoing – this emphasises ‘socialising 
accountability’; 
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A presumption in favour of collaboration – despite pressures on firms to 
differentiate themselves; 
Treatment of shareholder resolutions as a last resort; 
Voting with management except when management is given prior warning of intent 
to abstain or vote against; and 
Emphasis on face-to-face dialogue 
The industry does not claim that these practices can be identified as ‘standards’, yet managers 
follow the same approaches as their peers, even when there are doubts in some quarters about 
their effectiveness. For example, the literature indicates that the threat of a shareholder resolution 
must be credible, and backed by active voting (Carleton et al, 1998). Yet controversy greeted 
Morley Fund Management’s announcement that they would vote against the adoption of annual 
reports at major companies which failed to produce an environmental report, an indication of 
disagreement about the appropriateness of particular actions. 
 
Dresner (2002) also confirms that most funds have developed key performance indicators and 
audit trails and open their engagement audit to external verification. Almost all funds studied 
provide a detailed report of engagement to their institutional clients on a quarterly or half-yearly 
basis. Such reports name the companies concerned and cover the nature, objectives and 
progress of engagement. Most funds summarise and aggregate this data for public reporting 
to retail clients.  
 
3.4.  Investor Collaboration 
 
Collaboration between different investors theoretically makes engagement more effective by 
increasing leverage and reducing free-rider costs (Dresner, 2002). It also diffuses best practice, 
and indicates whether funds are likely to collaborate strategically if necessary to develop 
standards. Funds may collaborate on meetings, common statements and letters, and potentially 
on voting (within the constraints of ‘concert party provisions’). Most would consider 
collaborating on resolutions - even to the extent of sponsoring or cosponsoring. Several funds 
have in the past collaborated on research and a smaller subset of asset funds are informally 
discussing best practice processes for accountability and reporting. 
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However, there are strong reasons for relative investor inactivism, ranging from the fear that 
criticising management openly may damage share prices to the outright lack of interest in 
corporate governance. When the benefits of improved management are spread among all 
shareholders, it acts as a disincentive for individual shareholders – a classical free-rider problem - 
to take a closer interest in corporate governance. It is also easier to sell shares than to influence 
management, as it sometimes costs money as well as time to be active. Particular investment 
strategies, such as momentum strategies, within the industry also discourage players from taking a 
longer-term view of their shareholder value. 
 
However, activist investors will accept that they are bringing enhanced value for all investors in a 
company, regardless of whether other investors actively support them. Activist investors today 
also have had an easier time promoting their agenda to other investors as a result of a series of 
changes in the rules governing shareholder communications and proxy contests. In recent years, 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission has revised its rules several times to grant 
shareholders more leeway in communicating with each other about a company's performance and 
future. 
 
Box IV: Hermes: A Case Study 
The convergence of investor interests is one of the hallmarks of the new 
engagement policy. The approach favoured by funds such as Hermes is that if 
engagement really works as a value creator, then its advantages accrue to all 
constituents of the investment equation. As a result, a common ground is 
emerging between the traditional stakeholders' position that dominates in 
France, Germany and Japan, and the Anglo-American shareholders' primacy 
position. Common ground is being discovered as people realise that a 
company board has to be accountable to one group alone, or else it does not 
work. Increasingly, that group is being seen as the shareholders. 
The issue then becomes to what extent do the interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders converge? One may believe that companies that follow more 
active engagement approaches are those that in the long term will have the 
most success and profitability. So there will be less divergence of interests in 
the larger sense. 
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Emphasizing returns is exactly what Hermes has done with its Focus funds, 
and in the process attracted four of the UK's seven largest pension funds as 
investors. It has also come to see engagement as an integral part of passive 
equity management. The Focus funds may only have an investment horizon 
of two or three years, but because shares will also be held in one or other of 
Hermes' index-tracking funds, the charge of short-termism traditionally 
levelled at activists will hold little water.  
The firm believes in constructive dialogue, and is careful to avoid creating 
aggressive relationships. For instance, they will not support a hostile bid 
unless it is made clear before hand, and their activities are kept well out of the 
press. 
The rationale for the existence of the Focus funds is to try and create an 
economic impetus for corporate governance change by identifying 
companies where there is a gap between potential earnings and current 
earnings based on poor governance. Hermes Focus has three funds with 
€800 million under management and a team of 40, many of whom are 
management rather than investment professionals. 
For a passive manager (investor manager) the attractions of engagement are 
obvious. The only way your fund performs is if UK plc performs. So the only 
way to perform better is to make the index perform better. There is a vast 
value to be gained by a passive manager by focusing on its rights, duties and 
responsibilities as a shareholder. And when a company gets stuck, investors can 
help move it forward. As passive funds become more popular across Europe, 
engagement should receive another boost.  
Accepting that engagement works means accepting a new model of institutional 
investment. Interests naturally converge, with company employees, company 
management, pension fund managers and trustees all engaged in maximising 
company profitability, shareholder value and hence pension fund 
performance. 
  
Pension fund managers are expected to collaborate most, and with the widest range of 
partners, but occasionally they may engage alone when initiating a programme. Asset funds 
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may collaborate the least, given their investment profile. Partners may vary, essentially depending 
on who else holds the relevant stock. Collaboration is particularly sought to overcome 
intransigent management.  
 
Collaboration varies from issue to issue, is most common where targeting larger companies, 
and often occurs after initial one-to-one dialogue. Experience on engagement on corporate 
governance issues suggests that the building of mutual trust within a small group is necessary to 
generate constructive collaboration on both content and processes. 
 
Pension fund managers do not face the same pressures (since they hold stocks in relatively 
stable companies) as commercial managers (e.g. asset fund managers) - pressures that weaken 
incentives to collaborate. They find it easier to collaborate on corporate management issues. 
We might expect less collaboration by those funds most reliant on engagement for their 
identity and more by those who see it as a performance-enhancing tool subject to free-rider 
costs (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: A Simple Model of Investor Collaboration 
 Identity unimportant Identity important 
Leverage poor alone Pension funds – high 
collaboration 
Typical asset funds – 
medium collaboration 
Leverage good alone Larger pension funds –
medium collaboration 
Larger asset funds – low 
collaboration 
 
3.5.  Internet Communications  
 
It is likely that innovations in the electronic-based channels of communications will enhance the 
scope for investor activism and engagement practices. Investors are increasingly finding their way 
to Websites like those of the CalPERS and the Domini Fund, a $1 billion socially conscious 
index fund. Both sites broadcast or post votes for the upcoming proxy season on companies they 
hold in their portfolios, as well as provide pages or chat rooms to facilitate communication 
between individual investors.  
 
CalPERS goes one step further. Investors who vote on their site will automatically receive an e-
mail of the voting results. During the proxy season in year 2003, the site received about 1,700 hits 
from investors or the media. 
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 Box V: Investor Activism on the World Wide Web: A Case Study 
A new Internet-based fund, currently pending Securities and Exchange 
Commission approval, may take shareholder activism and investor 
engagement to a higher level. Privateer Asset Management's Allied Owners 
Action Fund will take stakes of up to five per cent in small to medium-sized 
companies that the fund manager believes could benefit from shareholder 
activism. Companies that are judged to have lax management, excessive 
inventory, under-used assets or passive boards of directors will become likely 
candidates for the portfolio.  
Once the fund has reached its desired equity stake, it will start posting its 
holdings online for discussion on its Web site, www.eRaider.com.  
The fund's shareholders – as well as shareholders of the companies the fund 
invests in – will be invited to converse via online message boards. According 
to the fund's prospectus, the target is to "improve [the] communication of 
ideas and strategies between company management and shareholders as a 
result of the message board, resulting in [the] increased value of the 
purchased company's stock." Allied Owners fund's management is expecting 
to pressure management of the companies it buys to make changes it believes 
will improve the companies' stock prices. The fund itself will not comment 
on board messages.   
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4.  Investors and Management Practice 
 
As our internet case study demonstrates (Box V), issues such as lax management, excessive inventory, 
under-used assets or passive boards of directors may well be the focus of investor engagement. The 
present section aims to provide a detailed investigation of the management practice areas that 
may be the focus of investor engagement for improved company performance. Building on 
relevant research in incentives, and on accounting and management literature on company 
performance, the study also develops research hypotheses for further empirical research.  
 
However, a caveat is in order. While investor engagement is generally seen as a good thing, there 
is the potential for fund managers to go overboard. Investors are not in a position to make 
detailed business decisions and should make sure they do not interfere with day-to-day 
operations of the business. The best course is to take on key management issues and focus only 
on those fundamental subjects. We therefore highlight only general management practice areas 
where there is potential for dialogue and engagement. 
 
4.1.  Time Horizon 
 
Investors differ in their need for liquidity. For example, pension plans, both private and public, 
tend to have significantly predictable, long-term outflows to beneficiaries. This ability to have a 
measured assessment of their outflows gives them the flexibility to develop a long-term 
perspective regarding their investments (Monks and Minow, 1996; Brown, 1998). This may then 
translate into funds offering their portfolio firms the benefit of ‘patient’ capital (Porter, 1992). 
Consequently, there will be potential for increased influence from these institutions (Black, 1992; 
Gibson, 1990; Millstein, 1991). 
 
Unlike pension fund managers, mutual fund managers and bankers face beneficiaries who may 
redeem their shares at any time, leaving these funds with a much shorter time horizon and a 
much greater liquidity requirement (Levinthal and Myatt, 1994; Monks and Minow, 1996). Mutual 
funds in particular experience high portfolio turnover, frequent sale of shares of under 
performing firms, and use of the proceeds to buy shares of firms with arguably better prospects. 
Their shorter investment horizon means that they will need to rely on market forces rather than 
engagement as the means of improving fund performance. It follows therefore that investors 
with longer investment time horizons tend to favour engagement more than those with shorter 
investment time horizons. 
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The investment time horizon of financial institutions will have a direct effect on management 
decisions about project selection. Research in incentives frequently observes a tendency among 
managers to focus on the short term and ignore the long run implications of their actions. This is 
because the time horizons of managers differ from those of investors. Because the stock price of 
the company reflects the capitalized value of future profits, an action that increases future profits 
makes the company more valuable to investors, who can enjoy the higher profits through future 
dividends or unanticipated capital gains. Investors therefore want managers to take actions that 
increase the long-term value of the company. But a manager may be more concerned about 
securing short-term personal benefits than maximizing the long-term value of the company. 
Specifically, when actions cannot be observed easily by owners, managers may have an incentive 
to take decisions that may have adverse long term consequences. 
 
For example, for short-term financial gains managers may avoid making investments in projects 
with long-term payoff yields. Therefore, ideal management practice will involve managers taking 
decisions today that increase future profits. Active investors (where they are looking for long-
term returns) engage with managers to mitigate an excessively short-term focus. We suggest: 
 
A greater role of investor engagement in governance leads investors to mitigate any short-term focus of senior 
managers. 
 
4.2.  Investment in Intangibles 
 
Many organisations recognise that a big part of their true value depends upon intangible factors 
such as organisational knowledge, customer satisfaction, product innovation and employee 
morale, rather than on physical assets such as real estate or physical plant. However, 
understanding and measuring the role of intangible factors in value creation poses a formidable 
challenge. Lev and Zarowin (1999) argue that the non-recognition of intangibles on the balance 
sheet has caused a significant decline in the relevance and usefulness of accounting reports. In the 
popular press there are concerns that ‘arcane’ accounting rules devised for a bricks-and-mortar 
economy may be ill-suited to an economy in which many firms derive their competitive 
advantage from investments in intangibles. Under current accounting rules, R&D outlays are 
disclosed as a line item in the income statement but are not allowed to be capitalised on the 
balance sheet. However, many other intangible investments are not even identified in the 
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financial statements. For example, investments that create brand value, increase customer base, 
enhance a firm’s information technology, or improve product and process design are not 
distinguished from operating expenditures.  
 
If expenditures on intangibles are not measured and identified separately, there will be little 
incentive for managers to appreciate their true value to the company. For example, in service 
industries the most significant long-term investment in intangible assets is in providing training in 
areas such as improved customer service. However, the evidence on training expenditures points 
to the way companies invariably adopt an ad hoc approach in promoting their intangible assets 
(Bishop, 1997). This may be because of the narrow focus of salaried managers. A better approach 
is likely to come from outside investors who may want company managers to appreciate and take 
a more proactive approach towards investment in intangibles such as training provision in 
customer service (Finegold and Soskice 1988). We therefore predict: 
 
Investor influence will be positively correlated with company investment in 
intangibles.   
 
4.3.  Economic Uncertainties  
 
The evolution of financial institutions over the last two decades has been characterised by the 
development of strong investor incentives for economic growth and development. Hawley and 
Williams (2000) characterise the present-day institutional shareholders as ‘universal owners’. 
Because pension funds tend to have holdings in a broad cross-section of the listed company 
sector, this has encouraged them to take a wider view of the economy. The growth of the whole 
economy is what matters to them, not the short-term gains that can be obtained through the 
operation of the market for corporate control. Specifically, they will show less interest in takeover 
bids that result in substantial gains for target shareholders, but which do not produce in the long-
run enhanced returns for shareholders in bidder companies. This is because of their likely equity 
stakes in both sets of firms. 
 
Further, prudential investment standards require funds to diversify their holdings across the 
market as a whole. Therefore, ‘universal owners’ become locked into both the market and the 
individual companies in which they hold stakes. Responding to management failures by selling 
their stakes in the companies concerned does not remain an option; being subject to lock-in 
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clearly forces them to engage with management on a long-term basis so as to improve 
performance. One significant implication of this interest in the economy as a whole is to adopt a 
wider view of the economy for the assessment of managerial actions. 
 
Economic literature on company performance hypothesises that companies facing a high level of 
economic uncertainty are likely to use sub-optimal management strategies to avoid undue risks 
(Lazear, 1998). It is argued that economic constraints impose greater demands on managers to try 
to insulate their companies from outside volatile environments. There exist specific 
circumstances where variations in output are beyond the company’s control, thus increasing their 
exposure to risk and volatility. 
 
Pension funds with a ‘universal owner perspective’ have an incentive to encourage companies to 
absorb negative externalities. They do not punish companies for taking risks in production or 
service provision when there is an economic downturn, thus helping them to make more efficient 
tradeoffs between risk and insurance. To the extent that investors are willing to filter out 
uncontrollable factors, thereby reducing the ‘noise’ element in their assessment of company 
performance, they will have a more efficient investment profile. Hence, we conclude:  
 
Investors with holdings in a broad cross-section of listed companies encourage 
company managers to have a better balance between risk and insurance. 
 
4.4.  Innovation in Product Markets 
 
Economic uncertainties can harm company policies towards adopting a proactive approach 
towards innovation and research & development. For instance, a strand of literature argues that 
firms in laissez-faire market systems (e.g. Anglo-Saxon systems) tend to place more emphasis on 
narrow financial objectives than on broader considerations such as market share (Carr and 
Tomkins, 1998). Such a practice associated with liquid equity markets may only be conducive to 
radical product innovations by facilitating flotation of high-growth firms, as in the information 
technology and bio-medical industries. By contrast, firms in Germany and Japan secure and 
maintain competitive advantage via incremental innovation in production processes and through 
product enhancement. Therefore, their innovation strategy is more broadly-based and 
encompasses all product markets. These observed differences in innovation strategies are likely to 
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influence management decision-making in relation to R&D expenditures, training, and skill 
development.  
 
Specifically, more direct involvement of finance in governance may engender a pattern of 
stronger internal commitment to both product and process innovation. In addition, there will be 
better employee incentives relating to in-house training, longer job tenures and lower employee 
turnover (Frick 1997). These factors may also promote stronger internal labour markets, resulting 
in stable employment at firm level. It is argued that such ‘relational financing’, largely associated 
with countries such as Japan and Germany, provides better investment for skill development as 
managers are less prone to cut investment in training when there are cash-flow shortfalls. By 
contrast, pressures of outside finance in the USA and UK have generally created deficiencies in 
skill formation (Finegold and Soskice 1988). 
  
The view has been advanced that the pressures of financial institutions for maintaining share 
prices and dividends result in senior managers starving R&D of resources required for 
investment and inhibit investment in new process innovations. Stock market short-termism is 
seen as inhibiting investments in long-term projects, which may involve high risk but also high 
rewards. Evidence for the low levels of investment in industrial R&D by British companies 
compared with foreign competitors has been long standing; levels of public expenditure are less 
unfavourable (DTI Innovation Report 12/03). The role of financial investors in creating this 
situation is difficult to demonstrate. On the one hand, industrial managers cite the insistence of 
'the City' in maintaining high levels of dividend distribution as a reason for the failure to invest in 
long-term R&D. Hence unrealistic targets were set for earnings growth and returns on assets, to 
support high share prices. On the other hand, a range of organisational features within industry 
itself are held to explain the low level of investment in R&D, including the low representation of 
scientists and engineers amongst senior managers, the disjuncture between publicly-funded 
research and industrial development, the preoccupation with investment in innovations designed 
to reduce the costs of production, rather than development of new products, the use of 
inappropriate measures of management performance, and so on. 
 
The impact of institutional investors upon innovation is likely to differ between sectors.  The 
UK's outsider form [describe]of corporate governance is hypothesised to be especially 
appropriate for innovation in sectors where: (1) rapid changes in products may require firms to 
be allowed to fail - Schumpeter's (1959) 'creative destruction'; (2) the assets providing competitive 
advantage are physical, rather than human; (3) there is strong patent protection, inhibiting reverse 
engineering and imitation; (4) the rents from innovation are easy to appropriate (and preferably 
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measurable) (Visintin and Tylecote, 2003; Casper and Whitley, 2002). These characteristics are 
more likely to be found in high technology sectors, and in pharmaceuticals, than in mid-
technology sectors such as motor vehicles. The DTI's own innovation data supports this analysis, 
with UK research concentrated in pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and the special case of the 
defence industry. The outsider form of corporate governance also fits the classic 'first generation' 
model of new product development, with its scientific research Æ product design Æ engineering 
Æ manufacturing Æ marketing Æ sales sequencing, permitting the disaggregated appropriation 
of profits at each stage. The arms-length outsider approach to corporate governance is 
hypothesised to be especially inappropriate where innovation involves a close linkage between 
new product development and the production process, as in the cumulative product and process 
innovations characteristic of Japanese office products and consumer electronics (Fruin, 1997). 
The outsider approach is also unhelpful when new product development requires overlapping 
and integrated systems, because of the difficulty of disaggregating rents (as well as the difficulty in 
monitoring complexity). Outsider systems encourage discontinuous innovation, insider systems 
cumulative innovation. 
 
We therefore conclude: 
 
More direct involvement of finance in governance reinforces a committed 
management approach towards innovation and product development.   
 
4.5.  Non-financial Performance 
 
Investors’ expectations of companies can be purely financial or can focus on both financial 
performance and more qualitative measures (Johnson and Greening, 1999). The explicit 
recognition of promoting effective management practice is a manifestation of activism and 
engagement (Romano, 1993; Smith, 1996; Wahal, 1996). In contrast, sole concern for maximising 
shareholder value may avoid the costs of activism by buying and selling shares based purely on 
financial performance, but, implicitly, involves free riding on the efforts of other investors who  
engage and bear all the resultant costs of engagement. 
  
While traditional performance parameters, such as commercial transactions, output and income, 
are recognised as valuable indicators, the broader criteria of efficiency has now become necessary 
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for understanding how to achieve competitiveness in various sectors of the economy. From a 
commercial perspective, it is now imperative not only to outperform competitors on output or 
income, but also to be competitive on service provision and customer satisfaction. As a result, 
organisational processes such as cost, quality and the time bases in the new ‘hyper-competitive’ 
environment have acquired a new significance in companies’ plans to secure and maintain 
competitive advantage (Cooper, 1995).  
 
This new emphasis on the specific role of organisational parameters means that non-financial 
indicators such as quality or customer service are assigned higher weights in performance 
measurement – a re-balancing of the ‘balanced scorecard’ (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Euske et 
al., 1993; Hoque and James, 2000). Investors in closer contact with company management 
recognise the importance of such parameters of company performance. Therefore, company 
financial performance is measured against any change in non-financial performance. The 
resultant proposition states:  
 
Activist investors focus on both the financial and non-financial performance in 
targeted firms. 
 
4.6.  Strategic Orientation of Activist Investors 
 
Strategy requires close collaboration. Different bodies or functional boards and committees may 
have to cooperate with each other to find common ground and arrive at a consensus on 
development plans and solutions. Corporate boards are often vested with a dual role of both 
monitoring and developing strategy. This may, however, engender conflict between non-
executive and executive directors if there is a too much emphasis on monitoring, ”whereas the 
more traditional job of forming strategy requires close collaboration”.  
 
The problem may be more daunting for outside investors as outside parties, whether they be 
investors or independent directors, depend largely on the chief executive and the company’s 
management for information. In the event that things start to turn sour, there is little scope for 
the independents to exact change, except, perhaps, resorting to the extreme option of sacking the 
CEO. However, outside investors can affect change by emphasizing a core set of company values 
during different stages of their involvement (Carr and Tomkins 1998). The effect is mainly 
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through their direct involvement in the appointment and dismissal of CEOs and 
Board/Committee Members but specific company targeting may also assist strategy intervention. 
The traditional issues of corporate strategy are managing a set of natural stakeholders, involving 
dealing with its suppliers and customers, and facing certain competition. Managing these 
stakeholders should thus be seen as part of the value-creation process. A focus on value helps 
delineate the factors responsible for a successful strategy programme. Value-based strategies are 
also about tradeoffs, that is making choices from a set of alternatives, trading off one factor 
against another, in order to produce a well-coordinated programme (Porter, 1996). By thinking in 
terms of trade-offs, we are able to choose the most relevant capability set necessary for exploiting 
synergies and interdependencies.  
 
A strategic audit of the company’s relationships will give investors the opportunity to help 
companies focus on key areas of concern. The role of the Board, its Committees and senior 
management is to plan for providing the strategic direction necessary for long-term growth of the 
organisation. It is necessary to think through all facets of the business, examining strategies and 
their implications in terms of the necessary tradeoffs. What are the important components of 
these plans?  The following three areas may be considered: 
  
(1) The operational section identifies key performance areas in relation to 
administration, human resource management, including employment relations 
matters, recruitment, training, manpower planning, etc. 
(2) The marketing section identifies key performance areas in relation to promotions 
and media relations, sponsorship and fundraising, merchandising, product 
development and service delivery, market positioning etc. 
(3) The financial section should include revenue and supply sources, financial plan - 
a budget for all operational and marketing items, and forecast balance sheet, cash 
flow, profit and loss statement. 
 
Investor involvement in the strategic audit of such plan components creates a more focused and 
integrated approach to strategy. For example, the objective of increasing customer numbers 
needs to be qualified by the standards of quality the company can offer. Investors can help make 
such tradeoffs. The following conclusion summarises this discussion:  
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By participating in the strategic audit of the company’s core capabilities, investors 
ensure better strategic trade-offs.  
 
More specifically, investor’s influence on strategy is apparent in the following three areas of 
concern: (1) restructuring and consolidation, (2) takeovers, and (3) relationships with contracting 
parties. We discuss these in turn. 
 
4.6.1.  Restructuring and Consolidation 
 
Investor influence on business strategy is most visible in the area of enterprise restructuring and 
consolidation. Consolidation trends in various industrial sectors have also influenced the degree 
of investor engagement. While merger and acquisition activity has slowed from a decade ago, 
activity has recently accelerated again with several large institutions announcing transactions and 
others declaring that they are back in the merger and acquisition business. Consolidation 
possibilities in the economy give an activist shareholder opportunities to push for a sale of the 
company as a realistic exit strategy and a means to maximize short-term shareholder value. At the 
same time, these trends give the investor a greater say in the decisions about enterprise 
restructuring and employment relations. These decisions may well be related to outside merger or 
acquisition but they may also affect the coordination process between different business units or 
departments. 
 
4.6.2.  Takeovers and Management Practice 
 
The highest profile impact of financial institutions upon management practice is through 
takeovers. Takeovers, or the threat of takeovers, are perceived as the major process in the market 
for corporate control through which financial markets 'discipline' management practice. Poor 
management is believed to be reflected in declining share price, prompting remedial action by 
investors either through direct intervention or disposal. Shareholder discontent results in a 
graduated response, from informal pressure on management through to share disposal.  The 
weakening of share prices encourages hostile bids. There has been extensive research on 
takeovers since the late 1970s, both in the UK and in the US, primarily by financial economists 
concerned with assessing the impact of takeovers on financial performance.  UK takeover rules 
prioritise the interests of shareholders: directors of target companies are required to act either 
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passively or to stimulate auctions to increase the shareholder rewards, not to act in the interests 
of other stakeholders. Deakin et al. (2002:11-12) argue that “The City Code, in articulating a 
strongly pro-shareholder position in the issue of management passivity, reflects the influence 
which institutional shareholders and City professionals have been able to bring to bear on the 
regulatory process. It is largely thanks to concerted shareholder pressure that poison pills and the 
more obvious kinds of takeover defence, such as ‘shark repellents’12 and ‘flip overs’13, have not 
been adopted to anything approaching the levels seen in the USA”. The overall impact of 
takeovers is believed to be to increase shareholder value, especially of shareholders in the target 
company - returns to shareholders in the bidding company are more uncertain. Franks and Mayer 
(2000) conclude that in the UK ”takeovers in general are good for shareholders, although most 
of the gains accrue to the target”.  Alternative methods of calculation, based on a residual income 
approach, are less positive, Bild and colleagues (2002) concluding that “on average acquisitions 
destroy roughly 30 per cent of the acquirer's pre-acquisition value”. 
 
There are direct and indirect behavioural consequences of takeovers and mergers. The most 
obvious change is in the composition of the board. It is reported that board composition 
changed in 90 per cent of successful hostile bids and in 50 per cent of friendly takeovers (Deakin 
et al. 2002). A second change is disposal of assets; a major effect of takeover activity is creating 
greater corporate focus. (The disposal of assets of course may be used to cover debt incurred in a 
takeover bid.) A third change is reduction in employment levels. For example, Deakin et al. 
(2002:30) report that job reduction followed in all of the fifteen hostile takeover bids in their case 
study research. 
 
The indirect consequence of takeovers is the disciplining of management performance. In 
accordance with market theory, poorly performing firms should be the targets for hostile 
takeover bids. However, Franks and Mayer (2002) argue that takeovers are more closely 
associated with size than with level of performance, large companies being more likely to be 
subject to hostile bids. There is, in their view, only a very loose connection between poor firm 
performance and takeovers. 
 
Investor engagement is more pronounced during periods of industry consolidation. 
                                                
12 A general term that refers to a corporate activity such as a golden parachute or poison pill that discourages a 
hostile takeover. 
13 A type of poison pill in which a company gives its shareholders the right to purchase shares in the acquiring 
company’s at a bargain price in the event of a takeover. 
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 4.6.3.  Relationships with Contracting Parties 
 
In commercial settings where transactions involve multi-task and multi-skill performance 
characteristics, both supplier and employment contracts are invariably incomplete. As economic 
models of choice among tasks in multi-task environments predict, companies will therefore direct 
their effort only to measured tasks and may ignore other important but unmeasured tasks (e.g. 
they focus on improving short-term profits but not market share or supplier relations) 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Output-based performance measures take an inadequate 
account of these unmeasured dimensions of transactions, thus resulting in major inefficiencies.  
For example, the importance of activities related to organisational learning may be neglected, 
limiting flexibility and the capacity to innovate. 
 
The ideal practice would permit contracts to use all possible information about the effects of 
management practices on all contracting parties involved, so that incentives are appropriately 
balanced across different dimensions of company performance (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). 
The void created by distortions due to multi-tasking (or incomplete contracts) can be filled by 
developing a more trusting relationship between contracting parties. Investors can play a major 
role in creating an environment of trust between companies, their employees and their suppliers. 
They can for example ensure ex post a fair distribution of the gains (or loss) for all parties 
involved. This relationship is captured by our next conclusion: 
  
Investors involved in governance may ideally encourage a trusting relationship 
between the company and its stakeholders. 
 
4.7.  Corporate Leadership 
 
The role of senior managers of companies, particularly chief executives, is a leadership one. A 
successful leader is a relatively rare commodity, and is commensurately valuable to a company and its 
shareholders. The cost of failures of leadership can be very high in terms of loss of shareholder value. 
A leader will have the ability to think strategically and evolve strategies and a vision that gives a 
business competitive advantage. Part of the role of the board is to judge the point at which the leader’s 
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own rewards threaten the franchise of the business with its customers, employees, shareholders or 
society as a whole. 
 
Although there is no formal role for investors in CEO selection, it is commonplace for 
institutional investors to be involved informally, nominating committees sounding out 
institutional investors on the acceptability of potential candidates. 
 
The literature on CEO selection and compensation is mostly informed by the principal-agent model 
(see also section 1.1). In an agency framework, managers will expropriate investor wealth mainly 
through over-consumption of perquisites, unless they are made to bear at least a proportion of the 
costs of such expropriation (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Incentive contracts are often employed to 
align managerial interests with those of shareholders by tying the manager’s compensation to the 
performance of the firm. Share ownership, share option schemes and performance-based bonus 
payments are used in various combinations to motivate managers to make shareholder wealth-
maximising decisions.  
 
This framework has been criticised on three grounds.  First, it is difficult to see how unobservable 
actions can be a sole driving force underlying CEO contracts because even if shareholders (or boards) 
could directly monitor CEO actions, they could not determine whether those actions were appropriate 
under the given circumstances (Murphy 1999). The second criticism is centred on the effort variable. 
As Holmstrom (1992) points out, CEO can choose from a wide range of actions, thus emphasising the 
need for CEOs to take a correct course of action or actions that benefit the shareholders. Therefore, 
the problem is not to get CEOs to work harder, but rather to ensure that their interests can be aligned 
with the interests of shareholders. The third issue is the identity of CEOs. The principal-agent model 
does not distinguish between different types of CEOs. Because boards are able to select CEOs from a 
large pool of candidates, they can always prefer those candidates whose personal characteristics are 
deemed to be more suitable for the business. For example, characteristics such as personal dedication 
to company goals and an ability to perform in risky environments may not be compensated by formal 
pay contracts. More importantly, the job of CEO may carry non-pecuniary benefits that individuals 
may value highly. Research in the traditions of organisational behaviour and psychology have identified 
gaining prestige and respect from others, being able to make what is viewed a lasting contribution, and 
having power over other people as important non-pecuniary benefits (Kaplan 1995). 
In fact, corporate boards may want to recruit individuals precisely because they value these non-
pecuniary benefits, both because such individuals may require less compensation and because having 
such individuals in positions of leadership may decrease social frictions within the organisation. We 
therefore conclude: 
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 Investors will want companies to select CEOs whose personal characteristics are 
suitable for the business. 
 
The role of institutional investors in top management personnel changes usually becomes evident 
only in times of crisis, when companies are seen to be failing (as with changes at Shell in 2004). 
However, stock market credibility is a necessary requirement for CEO selection. The selection of 
CEO is the responsibility of the board's nominating committee. This may be chaired by the 
chairman of the board or senior non-executive director; the involvement of the chairman is not 
recommended since the chairman of the board may be too closely identified with the outgoing 
chief executive. There is no formal role as such for investors in CEO selection. However, the 
selection requires the 'confidence' of the market, and canvassing support for candidates from 
institutions is likely. Khurana (2002) documents the role of Wall Street in CEO selection in the 
US, where the external recruitment of 'charismatic' CEOs expanded in the 1990s, specifically 
linked to the need for organisations to demonstrate commitment to shareholder value. 
 
Institutional investors, working through non-executive directors, may exert significant influence 
on the dismissal of CEOs in poorly performing companies. Hence Renneboog and Trojanowski 
(2003:16) conclude that the chances of the CEO of a poorly performing firm losing his or her job 
is 11.4 per cent in an insider-dominated firm, compared with 21.3 per cent in an outsider-
dominated firm. 
 
4.7.1.  Executive Compensation 
 
In recent years, boards have paid unprecedented attention to executive compensation, prompted 
mainly, but not exclusively, by huge compensation packages offered to executives prior to the 
collapse of companies, such as Enron and Global Crossings. However, despite the ensuing 
research activity on the topic, as Murphy (1999) pointed out previously, some of the most 
important questions have not yet been fully addressed. The research to date provides little 
evidence on the most fundamental question of all: whether increases in financial incentives lead 
executives to work harder in the interest of shareholders. Moreover, the relationship between 
remuneration and recruitment is unclear.  Would companies still be able to find and recruit able 
CEOs and executives if executive compensation was cut by a factor of two or more?  Evidence 
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from Germany and Japan, where CEO salaries are much lower than in the US, suggests 
recruitment would not be a major problem, but only if there was a change across the whole US 
CEO labour market. If just one firm tried to reduce its CEO salary, it would have major 
recruitment problems. 
 
The major difficulty in examining these questions is the lack of an appropriate baseline for 
assessing the level of executive compensation. Comparing CEO compensation with that of staff 
employees at the same company could be one such yardstick (Crystal 1991). One study 
employing this approach suggests that in 1970 the average S&P 500 CEO made about 30 times 
more than the average production worker (Murphy 1999). However, by 1996, that factor had 
increased to 90 times, excluding compensation received from exercising stock option. The factor 
rises to 210 times if option exercises are included.      
 
The second strategy is to use international data (Abowd and Bognanno 1995, Cosh and Hughes 
1997, Kaplan 1995). These studies have commonly found that US CEOs are the most highly 
compensated both relative to staff employees and in absolute terms. This can be partly explained 
by the fact that size and total compensation are related in virtually every country, and American 
companies tend to be larger in terms of market capitalization. However, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2000) advance the hypothesis that large corporations are particularly susceptible to 
what they call ‘skimming’. Because of the fact that there is a separation of ownership and control 
CEOs can effectively gain control of the pay-setting process. This is facilitated by the ability of 
CEOs to appoint their own favourites to the board and different corporate committees. Coupled 
with a naturally complex pay process, these factors conspire to allow CEOs to set their own pay 
with little oversight from investors. These practices may be more visible in environs of reduced 
government oversight and lack of large shareholders. 
 
Indirectly, investors are concerned with the overall criteria used in incentivising corporate 
managers, highlighting the priority of criteria maximising long-run shareholder value (Prendergast, 
1999). 
 
4.7.2.  ‘Options’ Strategy 
 
In the 1990s, the idea of executives’ share options solving the ‘agency problem’ gained 
widespread acceptance. There was a consensus that executive share options would give managers 
a powerful incentive to put the interests of shareholders first. Not foreseen was the fact that 
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share prices could deviate substantially from their fundamental value, and that management could 
help this process along in the short term. 
 
Because share options retain a strong element of effort incentives (though actual shares are 
probably a purer incentive and have shown themselves to be effective in motivating managers) it 
may not be necessary to stop using them. However, since they also provide an incentive to boost 
the share price in the short run, which may not be in the company's best long-term interest, 
measures need to be taken to remove that particular incentive. For instance, establishing an 
interval, say three years, between executives leaving the company and being able to exercise their 
options or sell their shares, reduces the incentives for short-run share price manipulation.  
 
Investors can work more diligently to oversee the work of a compensation committee. The goal 
should be to reward only genuinely superior performance. There are circumstances where a firm's 
share price might go up for extraneous reasons—a fall in interest rates or a rise in the stock 
market. The compensation committee must not allow managers to benefit from this. Rewards 
must be genuinely linked to a company's performance rather than general trends over which 
managers have little influence. For instance, if the firm outperforms the market as a whole, or an 
industry peer group only then rewards linked to share price make sense.  
 
Many investment institutions have taken the view that they have no objections to rewarding 
highly successful executives (pay for performance), but they take great exception to high levels of 
compensation paid to average and below average performance, and particularly to ‘rewards for 
failure’. It is therefore important to determine who should sit on the body responsible for 
designing and recommending compensation structures. 
 
Some investors may exercise influence in order to establish a pay-for-performance 
culture in targeted companies.   
 
4.8.  Flexible Management Approaches 
 
The impact of investor behaviour upon company senior executive salaries and benefit packages is 
direct, as our discussion above shows, whilst the impact upon the wages and salaries of lower 
level employees is indirect, through concern with controlling overall labour costs. The now 
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widely-held view that companies should adopt flexible management approaches is a direct 
corollary of this investor concern. This is because of the increasing potential for realizing lower 
labour costs with flexible management approaches. 
 
To put this observation in its correct economic context, we need to consider the current climate of 
employment and wage practices. The last two decades have seen major changes in the demand for 
skilled workers in industrialized countries. There are three discernible trends.  First has been the 
growth of non-manual wages and employment relative to manual workers. This has been accompanied 
by a worsening of the position of the unskilled relative to the skilled. Chennells and Van Reenen (1997) 
show that the skill premium has risen since the early 1980s. At the same time, the decline of 
employment among manual workers has been disproportionately concentrated among unskilled 
workers. Finally, there is evidence of widening wage inequality within skill categories (including the 
unskilled - Gosling, Machin and Meghir, 1994). 
 
Since the relative number of educated workers in the labour force has increased, wage 
differentials should, all else equal, have decreased. This has not happened. It is therefore 
suggested that education has become more valuable in a period of rapid technological change (i.e. 
that technology is the other factor that has changed - making higher-skilled jobs more productive, 
and hence counteracting the supply-side effect on wage differentials). This has led many authors 
to conclude that technology and human capital are relative complements (Kremer and Maskin, 
1996; Acemoglu, 1998). Workers of different skill-levels are clearly imperfect substitutes, and 
output is more sensitive to skill in some tasks than in others. As a result, one competitive strategy 
for enterprises is to specialise in one skill level or another, rather than employing workers with all 
skill types. The complementarity of tasks at the same skill level promotes assortative self-
matching; consider, for example, the case of Microsoft. New information technology has, in 
particular, spurred the move towards the complementarity of tasks.  
 
Flexible management approaches therefore might require that companies focus only on core 
capabilities (those that exploit task complementarities), whilst the auxiliary operations are 
contracted out to the market.  This allows companies to make substantial savings on labour costs 
without necessarily compromising quality and customer service standards. Thus our observation:  
 
Flexible management approaches may produce lower level employee labour cost 
savings for shareholder benefit, and investors may therefore be in favour of them 
and use their influence to promote them. 
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However, there are reasons investors may not be in favour of flexible working arrangements, 
such as contracting out particular functions. For example, they may feel worker involvement and 
participation is more difficult in the context of such a model (particularly for 
‘peripheral’/contacted out functions), and therefore that the workers will be less motivated and 
less productive. These concerns are particularly relevant to high value added business strategies. 
 
4.9.  Employee Skill: Development and Utilization  
 
We discussed above the mediatory role of finance in creating a more flexible management 
approach for carrying out company operations. Complementarities resulting from technological 
change, skill development or other internal or external factors such as improved investor-
manager relationships, economic liberalization etc., will lead towards higher levels of strategic fit 
among various corporate strategies and actions. Consequently, employee participation in 
decision-making has become a distinctive feature of modern manufacturing systems. 
 
Investments relating to R&D, the introduction of new technological systems and the workers’ 
training needs are areas where middle and lower level employees have superior information and 
knowledge, so that they can easily validate decisions falling in these particular domains, although 
this greater knowledge is not always sought or used. Decision-making at the middle and lower 
levels therefore has direct bearing on the product market strategies of the firm, especially in 
design and quality-oriented manufacturing systems (Charny, 1997). Therefore, higher productivity 
gains are realised by putting in place participatory forms of work practices such as teamwork, 
quality circles, delegation of authority to middle and lower tiers of managerial hierarchies etc.  
 
Moreover, empirical evidence on skills and wages, as mentioned above, also suggests that employees' 
skills have become increasingly heterogeneous between skill levels, but more homogenous and 
complementary within skill level over the years. This has implications for the practice of employee 
relations. If a firm follows the flexible firm model developed by Atkinson (1984), it needs to develop 
all necessary skills for its core operations (under the assumption that these skills complement each 
other), and on the other hand, it has to contract out or directly acquire from the market those skills 
that are not related to its core operations. The latter type skills (e.g. auxiliary skills) can be employed in 
short-term temporary contracts, or may be available from collaborating firms. For human resource 
development, the idea of a clear demarcation between the firm and the market has thus become 
blurred. Within a firm, a combination of higher wages, focused training programmes, and long-term 
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employment contracts will possibly be needed to develop complementary core skills. Investors may 
promote such a model, or might not consider it appropriate for the particular circumstances of the 
firm in question. 
 
The experience of skills development and learning is closely related to patterns of innovation. It 
has been argued that arm's length approaches to corporate governance emphasise the acquisition 
of narrow and concentrated skills sets, rather than diffuse and firm specific core capabilities 
(Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). The emphasis on high levels of specific capabilities is consistent 
with innovation in high technology, 'leading edge' sectors, as in software engineering. It is also 
consistent with high levels of mobility between firms, whether voluntary or because of the 
disappearance of firms through Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction. However, narrow 
and concentrated skill sets are not congruent with cumulative innovation and organisational, 
rather than individual learning. The incentive for the acquisition of narrow and concentrated or 
diffuse and firm-specific core skills depends, of course, upon the level of employment security; 
absent employment security (on either side of the employment relationship), the incentive to 
acquire firm-specific skills is limited. The absence of such skills restricts the potential for 
cumulative innovation. Moreover, reliance upon specific and concentrated skills reinforces 
functional segregation, stimulating professional commitment and learning at the cost of 
organisational commitment (Lazonick, 2002). Institutional investors are not responsible for the 
pattern of skills development, but outside (arms-length) systems of corporate governance foster a 
form of industrial organisation that encourages it. More activist investors, such as private equity 
firms, may be more directly involved in skills development policies in investee companies. 
 
Regardless of whether a firm uses flexible working arrangements such as contracting out, 
investors will have an interest in making sure it pursues good employee skill development policies. 
Developing business-relevant employee skill should increase productivity through their everyday 
work, and also through improving their contribution in employee involvement programs. A 
greater concern for quality and customer service in modern industrial systems means that skills 
and knowledge that employees bring to the strategic decision-making processes have direct 
impact on issues of concern at the corporate board level. Invariably, such employee actions are 
aimed at securing competitive advantage for the company. Investors' interests are therefore 
linked with how competitive strategies based on employees' capabilities are formed and 
implemented. We therefore conclude: 
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The greater role of investors in governance should be positively linked with an 
employee skill-based company development strategy aimed at securing competitive 
advantage, since an effective competitive strategy is clearly in the investors’ interest. 
 
4.9.1.  Financial Institutions and Employment Relations 
 
In systems of outsider corporate governance the direct influence of financial institutions on 
management practice is limited, institutions rarely monitoring firm performance at the level of 
functional detail. However, the indirect influence of financial institutions may be considerable. 
Market evaluations may be sensitive to employment relations' problems. Moreover, Capelli 
(2000:88) has argued that 'market mediated' employment relations were stimulated by institutional 
investment trends in the 1990s. “Developments in financial markets, especially for publicly-
traded companies, seek to make executives operate much more like stockholders….  Companies 
continue to shed operations that are not their core competence, turning to outsourcers to supply 
components or provide functions that had previously been handled inside.” Externalisation 
involved reductions in internal headcount, and management focus on managing the supply chain. 
The need to reduce headcount at the behest of ‘the City’ was stressed by enterprise managers. 
Hence managers in privatised 'Telecom' complained that the stock market focused on headcount 
as the measure of corporate efficiency and led managers to prioritise manpower reductions, even 
where they led to declines in the quality of services (Beynon et al., 2002:142). Pressure to reduce 
headcount has led to changes in employment practices, including increased reliance on overtime. 
Mergers or acquisitions were usually accompanied by job losses associated with improvements in 
company share prices (Deakin et al., 2001).  More widely, it is also argued that increased emphasis 
on shareholder value reduced the potential for partnership approaches between management and 
labour (Deakin et al., 2001:19).  The 'Tenswell' case in Deakin's Cambridge study showed the 
direct influence of shareholder (and debt holder) pressure leading to job losses and industrial 
relations conflict (Ibid. 23).  However, other case study companies had institutional investors 
willing to take a long-term view of shareholder interests, allowing 'partnership' arrangements to 
continue. In short, shareholder sovereignty did not require the destruction of partnership 
relationships between management and unions. 
 
Pressure on labour costs led to job losses, organisational restructuring, delayering, 
decentralisation, increased discretion and responsibility to lower level employees, increased skills 
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and increased stress (Gallie et al., 1998: Ch. 10). However, there is no evidence that financial 
institutions sought such solutions to problems of reducing labour costs; enterprise management 
teams chose such approaches. 
 
Gospel and Pendleton (2003) identify six main ways in which investors influence management 
decision making, with implications for employment relations. The six ways are: ”(i) the balance of 
support given by management for the interests of labour and capital; (ii) the time frame of 
managerial decision making; (iii) the nature of business strategies; (iv) the importance ascribed to 
financial factors in decision making; (v) the approach to securing managerial and employee 
commitment; and (vi) the degree of co-operation with other firms”.  The major areas in which 
shareholders' interests impact on employment relations include job security, level of earnings, 
degree of reliance on financial incentives for increased commitment, and skill requirements. 
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5.  Financing Choices of  Innovative Firms: An Empirical Study 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
In terms of the role of finance in management, the key question is: What are the goals of 
financiers, and how do they realize them? Their claims are likely to be influenced by the 
difference both between and within generic sources of finance, including internally-generated 
funds, debt, and share equity. Internal funds (retained profits, depreciation accounts) are generally 
at the discretion of management, and a large principal-agent literature on directly deals with the 
consequences of different managerial strategies and their impact on firm profitability. Debt is a 
contractual guarantee secured on future cash flows, and hence seen as a critical control on 
management behaviour (Hart 1995). Equity gives shareholders the right to receive some share of 
the future earnings (unspecified ex ante) and market value of the firm. Since the time frames and 
return expectations may differ between investors, it is important to know how various types of 
investors may have different preferences in terms of shareholder value and liquidity vis-à-vis 
control and private benefits (O’Sullivan 2000; Mayer 1997). 
 
This section explores UK firm-level data to shed light on whether different financing choices 
affect the strategies of firms with regard to investments in innovation. The empirical literature 
on capital structure often includes information on R&D activities as control variables (Titman 
and Wessels,1988; Bradley, Jarrell and Kim,1984), without focusing on the financial behaviour of 
innovative firms, and there is relatively little empirical evidence from outside the US. We do not 
attempt to provide a definitive answer or explanation here, but report patterns suggesting that 
further research on this subject is likely to be fruitful. 
 
More specifically, we find that as we move from less innovative firms to consider more 
innovative firms as measured by R&D intensity, more innovative firms may have more 
attractive investment opportunities and thus become more reliant on external sources of finance, 
but they go first for debt as it involves giving up less control rights than new equity. However, 
more R&D-intense firms may have no choice but to issue outside equity in order to meet the 
investors' participation constraint. This can potentially explain why the probability of issuing new 
equity rises monotonically with R&D intensity, whilst the use of debt finance starts to decline 
eventually as R&D intensity increases. 
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Relevant Literature: It is argued that bankruptcy costs are likely to be relatively low for firms with a 
high proportion of tangible capital among their assets, particularly property, and equipment 
associated with generally applicable technologies (Brealey and Myers, 2003, chapter 1). In contrast, 
innovative firms with a higher proportion of intangible assets, such as knowledge and 
reputation, and with more specialised equipment may experience higher bankruptcy 
costs, suggesting that such innovative firms are likely to be less reliant on debt finance, to 
mitigate higher expected bankruptcy costs. 
 
Others have emphasized agency costs and informational asymmetries between investors and 
firms' managers or entrepreneurs. For example, by selling equity to outside investors, the 
firm's managers may signal that its future prospects are less than excellent; otherwise they 
would have chosen debt finance, rather than equity to benefit from the firm's revenues (Myers 
and Majluf,1984).  
 
The ‘control rights approach’ is concerned with the allocation of decision rights - the lower the 
amount of tangible wealth or assets inside a firm, the more outside investors will insist on having 
control rights over the firm's decisions in order to satisfy their ex ante participation constraint 
(Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995). The gradual shift to debt-financing occurs as more 
investment funds are required. Ultimately, when the project's size (or scope) becomes sufficiently 
large and/or when assets become sufficiently intangible, firms will allocate fuller control rights to 
outside investors by issuing new equity. Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) provide interesting 
evidence on the nature of financial contracts in high-tech firms, suggesting that venture 
capital contracts are consistent with the predictions of the control rights theory (Lerner, 1992, 
1995). Carlin and Mayer (1999) also point to regularities in the relationship between a firm's 
financing mode and its type of productive activities.   
 
The predictions of these theories are evaluated in the present section. The evidence presented in 
this section sheds light on R&D intensity and financial structure from a panel of UK-listed 
companies over the period 1990-2002. We first examine a balance sheet measure of the 
importance of debt in the firm's capital structure. The probability that the firm raises funds by 
issuing new equity are then evaluated, including the composition of the firm's total debt. We also 
examine the shares of bank debt and secured debt in total debt. Our work differs from others 
(Hall, 2002) as we are mainly interested in the nature of more general financial choices made by 
innovative firms.  
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5.2.  Data 
 
We used company accounts data from Thomson Financial Datastream. Using the GDP deflator 
(computed from UK National Statistics series ABMI and YBHA) we convert all financial variables 
into constant prices. 
 
Reporting of R&D expenditure became compulsory for large and medium-sized UK firms in 
1989. Not all firms in our sample are larger than the size threshold at which R&D reporting 
becomes compulsory, but we have checked that all the results we present here are robust to the 
exclusion of the smaller listed companies from our sample. The accounting definition of R&D 
expenditure follows closely the OECD Frascati Manual classification, and there were no tax 
reasons for reported R&D expenditures to be exaggerated in the UK over this period. 
 
We therefore use data from published accounts for an unbalanced panel of 850 companies whose 
shares are listed on the London Stock Exchange, over the period 1990-2000.  
 
It is important to note that the information in company consolidated accounts relates to 
their worldwide activities, and not only to their operations in the UK. Our sample includes firms 
whose main activity is in manufacturing, extraction or construction, but excludes firms whose 
main activity is in the service sector, including finance. Tables are provided in the Appendix. 
 
Datastream provides a breakdown of firm sales according to UK SIC codes. We allocate firms to 
the industry in which most of their sales occurred. If they have the same sales in two industries, 
we pick the one with the highest reported profits. 
 
We have dropped observations if: 
 
• Total assets were negative, increased by more than 100 per cent or fell by more than 50 per 
cent in a year 
• Total capital employed was negative 
• Accounting years were shorter than 11 months or longer than 13 months  
• Any variable required for our analysis was missing 
• Firms report R&D erratically, i.e. switch more than once between reporting zero and non-
zero R&D 
• Bank debt or unsecured debt is greater than total debt.  
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 Our dependent variables are defined as follows14: 
 
Total debt / total assets: stock of debt repayable in more than one year (321) plus stock of debt 
repayable within one year (309) over total assets (392) 
Indicator for new equity issued: a dummy variable equal to one if cash raised from issue of 
ordinary equity or preferred stock (429) is positive, and equal to zero otherwise 
Bank debt / total debt: total bank debt (275 + 387) over total debt (321+309) Unsecured debt / 
total debt: unsecured debt (274) over total debt (321+309).  
 
Our R&D variables are defined as follows: 
 
- R&D firm dummy: a dummy variable equal to one if R&D expenditure (119) is reported to be 
positive in at least one year, and equal to zero otherwise 
- R&D intensity: R&D expenditure (119) over total sales (104).  
Our control variables are defined as follows: 
 
Number of employees: total number of domestic and overseas employees, including part-time, in 
millions (219) 
Real sales growth: growth of real sales (104) over the year 
Profitability: operating profits (137) over capital stock constructed using the perpetual inventory 
method. 
 
5.3.  Analysis 
 
Table 1 provides information on the incidence of R&D expenditures. It shows that 41 per cent of 
our sample firms report positive R&D expenditure in at least one year, and positive R&D is 
observed in 37 per cent of our 6236 firm-year observations. The distribution of R&D intensity 
(R&D/sales) is highly skewed among those observations with positive R&D, as shown in Table 2. 
It is interesting to note that mean of 2.97 per cent is considerably higher than the median of 1.58 
per cent, implying that there is a broader, more skewed tail to the right (higher levels of R&D) than 
to the left of the mean. 
 
                                                
14 Numbers in parentheses refer to Datastream accounts items. 
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Table 3 presents OLS (ordinary least squares) regression results for models of the ratio of total 
debt to total assets. In Table 3 we find an interesting non-linear relationship with the use of debt 
financing, as measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Firms with positive R&D tend to 
use more debt than firms with zero R&D, but among the R&D performing sub-sample the use of 
debt declines with R&D intensity. Those firms with the highest R&D intensities in our sample tend 
to have the lowest levels of gearing. Most of these firms are in pharmaceuticals, instrument 
engineering or telecommunication equipment.  
 
Column 1 includes the following explanatory variables: a zero/one dummy that identifies 
observations on firms that ever report positive R&D expenditure, and the firm's R&D intensity. 
A significant positive coefficient on the R&D firm dummy, and a significant negative 
coefficient on the R&D intensity variable were found. 
 
This pattern is robust to the inclusion of additional control variables (see Column 2). A 
significant positive effect of firm size on gearing, and a significant negative effect of 
profitability were found, but these factors are not highly collinear with our R&D variables. 
Columns 3 and 4 shows that this pattern is also robust to including a set of 20 sector dummies. 
 
Within groups or `fixed effects' estimates of these specifications, which allow for permanent 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms in their choice of capital structure are reported in Columns 
5 and 6. A significant negative effect of R&D intensity on the debt/assets ratio is found, 
suggesting that, for the same firm, an increase in R&D intensity is associated with a lower 
debt/assets ratio; the negative coefficient reported in earlier columns is not simply reflecting cross-
sectional differences between firms with low and high R&D intensities. 
 
The above specifications do not distinguish between finance raised by issuing new equity, and 
finance from `internal equity' or retained profits. Table 4 reports logit regression models where 
the dependent variable is one for an observation in which new equity is issued, and zero 
otherwise. A simpler relationship between R&D behaviour and the probability that firms raise 
finance by issuing new equity is found. Firms with positive R&D are more likely to issue equity 
than firms with zero R&D, and the use of new equity increases further with R&D intensity. 
Those firms with the highest R&D intensities in our sample thus tend to be the most likely to use 
new equity finance. The probability of issuing new equity is higher for firms that report R&D 
compared to firms that do not report R&D, and tends to increase with R&D intensity among 
those firms with positive R&D (Column 1).  
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report simple OLS regression models of the share of bank debt in 
total debt, whilst columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 report corresponding specifications for the share 
of unsecured debt in total debt. The shares of bank debt and secured debt in total debt are both 
lower for firms that report R&D compared to those that do not, and tend to fall as R&D intensity 
rises. The significance of these patterns is however dominated by cross-sectional differences 
between firms, and becomes very weak when we control for firm-specific `fixed effects' and 
rely on time series variation within the observations on the same firm for identification. 
 
These two sets of results appear to be largely consistent with the control rights approach, whereby 
the pecking order between internal finance, debt and outside equity is driven by the interplay 
between the size of desired investment, the tangibility of assets, the allocation of control rights, 
and the investors' participation constraint. The financial behaviour of more innovative firms, as 
indicated by the presence and extent of R&D expenditure, differs significantly from the financial 
behaviour of less innovative firms in more than one way. They are more likely to raise funds by 
issuing shares, and this probability increases with R&D intensity. 
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Statistical Tables 
 
Table 1: Share of Firms / Observations with Positive R&D 
Fraction with positive R&D Firms
 41.3% 
Observations     37.4% 
Table 2: Distribution of R&D Intensity (Observations with Positive R&D) 
Mean Std Deviation Median _________Lower quartile Upper quartile 
2.97% ________7.44% 1.58%________0.54% _______ 2.92% _______ 
Table 3: Total Debt as a Share of Total Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total debt / total assetsDep. Variable 
Time effects 
Group effects 
Year Year 
0 021 0 021
Year 
Industry 
dummies
Year 
Industry 
dummies
Year 
Firm fixed
effects
Year 
Firm fixed 
Effects
Dummy (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
R&D/sales -0.239 -0.321 -0.145 -0.291 -0.228 -0.287 
 (0.087)*** (0.063)*** (0.056)*** (0.096)*** (0.122)** (0.139)** 
Employees 0.659 0.432 0.091 
(millions) (0.118)*** (0.137)*** (0.270) 
Real sales -0.003 -0.015 -0.017 
Growth (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)* 
Profitability -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 0.145 0.165 0.186 0.139 0.151 0.183 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Observations 6236 5768 6236 5768 6236 5768 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
R-squared statistics in columns (5) and (6) exclude variation explained by firm fixed effects 
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Table 4: Probability that New Equity is Issued 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Positive amount of new equity issued Dep. Variable 
Time effects 
 
Year Year Year  Year Year Year 
Group   Industr Industry Firm fixed Firm fixed
Effects   dummi Dummies effects Effects 
R&D firm  0.493 0.445 0.530 0.438  
Dummy  (0.059)*** (0.061)*** (0.068)* (0.069)***  
R&D/sales  5.894 5.792 4.549 6.589 4.386 14.673 
  (1.695)*** (1.114)*** (1.378)* (1.242)*** (2.336) (5.576)***
Employees  22.341 21.263 8.119 
(millions)  (3.159)*** (3.345)*** (10.893) 
Real sales  1.276 1.134 0.576 
Growth  (0.593)*** (0.231)*** (0.199)***
Profitability  0.137 0.123 0.184 
  (0.026)*** (0.022)*** (0.078)* 
Constant  -19.342 -14.894 -16.752 -18.893  
  (0.121)*** (0.139)*** (0.154)* (0.212)***  
Observations  5871 4234 5967 4119 3234 3728 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 5: The Structure of Debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank debt / total debt Unsecured debt / total debt Dep. variable 
Time effects 
Group effects 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Dummy (0.016)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)*** (0.017)***
R&D/sales -0.433 -0.487 0.118 0.286
 (0.176)*** (0.272)** (0.154) (0.278)
Employees  -2.153 2.387
(millions)  (0.291)*** (0.389)***
Real sales  -0.064 -0.011
Growth  (0.011)*** (0.069)
Profitability  0.004 0.000
  (0.002)* (0.003)
Constant 0.693 0.684 0.497 0.587
 (0.017)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)***
Observations 5329 5842 5298 5219
R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 -96-
6.  Management Influences on Investors 
 
The major emphasis of this report is on investors’ influence on management practice.  However, 
the relationship between investors and managers is not simply one in which investors act and 
managers react: it is a two-way relationship.  Managers manage their relations with shareholders, 
as they seek to manage their relations with other stakeholders.  The most important way in which 
managers seek to manage shareholders is through managing shareholders’ expectations.  
According to one trade union official “It's what managers promise to shareholders, not what 
shareholders demand of management” (quoted in Deakin et al., 2001:25). With their command of 
organisational resources, managers are able to educate investors in long-term company strategy. 
The investors' major alternative source of knowledge includes comparative statistics on sector 
performance, although even here managers may have deeper knowledge. Senior management 
seeks to influence stock analysts and major investors both directly and indirectly. Directly, 
managers organise one-on-one discussions. The meetings between managers and fund managers 
and senior managers of institutional investors tend to be formal, with CEO, chairman and 
finance director present, often linked to the interim and year-end results (Stiles and Taylor, 
2002:90). “For any company, there is a hierarchy of investors and, to some extent, analysts, in 
terms of size and influence. The largest investors can usually ask to see any of the company 
directors they choose, and nearly always the chief executive, chairman, and finance director will 
be present”. Larger investors are wined and dined, smaller investors dealt with over the telephone 
or even handled by the public relations department. According to one chief executive, 
 
”We used to be a fairly secretive company, primarily because we are operating in a very 
competitive market. But we realized that we were treated with something like suspicion in 
the City. We wanted to raise money to fund an acquisition and we knew that if we didn't 
open up more, we would have trouble finding capital easily. We arranged a series of 
meetings, with shareholders, analysts, journalists, to describe our strategy and how we do 
things. It went down very well, and meetings are now much more regular, either over 
lunch or at set-piece occasions” (quoted, Ibid. 90-91). 
 
Keeping investors informed is a means of boosting external confidence in the company, 
generating a better understanding of long-term company strategy, and possibly making friends 
whose support might be necessary in the case of threatened takeover. Indirectly, senior managers 
seek to cultivate investors through press relations, especially the business press. 
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The benefits of carefully managed investor relations are evident in the AstraZeneca case (Ramirez 
and Tylecote, 2003). The major investor in AstraZeneca, with $5 billion investment, is a US 
corporation.  AstraZeneca devote significant attention to managing the investors' expectations, 
especially regarding the projected flow of drugs through the R&D pipeline. Although an Anglo-
Swedish firm, AstraZeneca makes its presentations in the US.  Management of expectations is 
especially important in pharmaceuticals, because of the long development time, and the limited 
time period for exploitation of ethical products (see GlaxoSmithKline case in the case study 
research, published separately). The value of devoting resources to managing the relationship 
with investors depends upon the investors' willingness to engage with the company and the 
sector. 
 
There are, however, major limitations to the closeness of relations between senior managers and 
specific shareholders. To avoid concerns over insider trading, senior managers can make only 
limited information available. A level playing field has to be maintained for all potential investors. 
Many investors do not wish to be actively engaged in company management, because of the wish 
to avoid possible conflicts of interest. Moreover, investors perceive there to be significant 
information costs incurred in monitoring performance. There is therefore a narrow limit to the 
information that managers may divulge in seeking to inform investors - general statements about 
the company's strategy or approach to innovation may be appropriate, specific information about 
new product development not (with the possible exception of pharmaceuticals). 
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7.  Investor-Management Relations in International Perspective 
 
7.1.  Summary 
 
In previous sections we have sought to achieve three major objectives.  First, we have identified 
and explained in detail the forms of investor engagement with investee firms, showing how 
different types of investors have different levels of incentive to engage with the companies in 
which they have invested.  We have shown that pension funds and private equity funds have the 
highest levels of incentive to engage with the companies in which they invest, for different 
reasons.  Pension funds – especially public sector pension funds – have high incentives because 
of their long time horizons and predictable commitments, the characteristics par excellence of 
‘universal owners’.   Private equity funds maximize their returns by ‘coaching’ their portfolio 
companies through the problematic early phases of development.  However, we acknowledge 
that the implementation of incentives may be affected by the institutional arrangements for the 
management of funds, especially the incentives used for investment managers, inside and outside 
the fund.  These issues are explored in Parts 2 and 3.   
 
Secondly, we have examined the forms of development adopted by investors, especially 
approaches adopted by private equity funds.  Such funds engage extensively in the early strategic 
development of their portfolio companies, the extent depending upon the level of knowledge of 
the specific sector by the equity fund managers.  Universal owners engage with their investee 
firms in different circumstances, primarily when firms are underperforming or act against the 
norms of good corporate governance.  We identify an escalator of engagement, with increasing 
degrees of formality.   
 
Thirdly, we examine the areas of management practice in which investors might be expected to 
intervene.  We develop hypotheses regarding issues on which investors might be expected to 
intervene and provide evidence of where they do so.  Intervention by institutional investors is 
primarily concerned with strategic issues, including take-overs, corporate restructuring and CEO 
selection, and corporate governance issues, including the role of Remuneration Committees and 
levels of senior management remuneration.    Private equity funds engage with their investee 
firms in a wide variety of ways, ‘coaching’ them through the early stages of business development: 
the detailed methods used are identified in Part 2 of the report.  However, a focus on explicit 
interventions underestimates the role of investors, since senior management behaviour results 
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from extensive discussions, especially with investors.  The market signal of declining share prices 
changes management practice without investor intervention.   
 
How far is this pattern, and the growth of shareholder value, a result of specifically British 
circumstances?  We address this issue by comparing the UK with the US and Germany. 
 
7.2.  Investor Relations in International Perspective: UK, US and Germany 
 
The US and the UK - the liberal market economies 
In international comparative studies of ‘divergent capitalisms’ (to quote the title of Richard 
Whitley’s 1999 study), the US and UK are usually referred to jointly as ‘Anglo-Saxon’ liberal 
market economies, with the US as the primary exemplar.  As Hall and Soskice put it, in rather 
general terms, in liberal market economies ‘firms co-ordinate their activities primarily via 
hierarchies and competitive market arrangements.  Market relationships are characterized by the 
arms-length exchange of goods and services in a context of competition and formal contracting.  
In response to the price signals generated by such markets, the actors adjust their willingness to 
supply and demand goods or services, often on the basis of the marginal calculations stressed by 
neoclassical economics’ (2001:8).  Liberal market economies have high levels of stock market 
capitalisation, with high transaction turnover.  Firms in liberal market economies give priority to 
maintaining profitability and share prices, and avoiding threats of takeover, rather than firm 
growth or market share or employment security.    Systems of financial control and corporate 
governance are characterised as ‘outsider’ and ‘arms-length’, with Boards of Directors as the 
guardians of the interests of shareholders, as the owners of the firms in which they invest: the 
interests of other stakeholders are marginal.  Outsider systems are seen as fostering innovation 
through facilitating the creation of new firms and increasing the agility of existing firms in 
responding to changes in product markets and technology.  The financial system, modes of 
technology transfer, labour markets and education and training systems complement each other 
in a more or less integrated business system.  Hence the financial system is based on ‘free market 
competition’ sustained by level playing fields, publicly accessible information and open market 
access.  Technology transfer occurs through inter-organisational competition and restructuring 
labour and mobility, within a framework of anti-monopoly and anti-trust legislation.  Capital 
markets are competitive, de-regulated and liquid.  Labour markets are flexible, with relative ease 
of hiring and firing, flexible wages sensitive to external market rates and little co-determination.  
The education system provides for state investment in general skills (literacy, numeracy), with 
more specific skills and professional training generally being the responsibility of the individual.   
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 The LME system is theoretically well suited to radical innovation.  Capital markets provide the 
resources for investment in new products and services, venture capital attracted by high risk 
premiums.  The absence of ‘lock-in’ through worker participation and labour market institutions 
allow labour to move easily between firms.  The low level of employment security rules enables 
senior management to redeploy labour within the firm.  Strong managerial prerogatives enable 
managers to reorganise production processes.  Innovation is especially facilitated in sectors 
characterised by novelty, appropriability and visibility (Tylecote et al., 2002:2) – such as 
information technology, medical engineering and pharmaceuticals. 
 
The fluidity of capital markets has enabled the rapid development of new, high-tech sectors and 
revitalised established sectors.  However, O’Sullivan (2001a) has argued that the relationship 
between investors and managers in the US does not provide a good environment for the 
development of the organisational learning and incremental innovation seen as required for 
competitive ‘middle technology’ companies.  The emphasis on shareholder value has led to 
‘downsize and distribute’ rather than ‘retain and reinvest’ practices.  The theories of 
principal/agent have given too much attention to issues of entitlement and distribution and too 
little attention to production, and especially innovation.  Moreover, the success of ‘Wintelism’ – 
new production systems based on combining central control of design and branding with 
outsourcing of production to specialised component producers – has not provided the basis for 
sustainable prosperity.  Design innovations can seep to competitors, component producers can 
evolve ‘upstream’ and consumer brand loyalty can prove fickle. 
 
The British system is heavily influenced by the US liberal market economy model, and in broad 
international comparisons the UK and the US are appropriately classed together.  Legal norms 
and business practices are broadly similar, as Black has argued (above, page 20).  This similarity is 
reinforced by the substantial flow of capital from the US to Britain, and from Britain to the US. 
The two countries enjoy common practices, for example in accounting standards.  The close 
Anglo-American working relationships are evident in the GlaxoSmithKline case study (one of the 
investor influence on management practice case studies, published separately).  However, there 
are important differences between Britain and the US with implications for the relations between 
investors and managers.  First, the level of stock market capitalisation relative to GDP is much 
higher in Britain than in the US, implying even greater potential investor influence in Britain than 
in the US.  Second, institutional stock ownership is much more concentrated in Britain than in 
the US, encouraging much closer ties between leading shareholders and corporate management.  
The concentration of financial and corporate senior management in London reinforces this close 
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association (reflected, for example, in the network linkages of non-Executive Directors).  Thirdly, 
there is a higher proportion of stock ownership in pension funds, who are more assertive about 
shareholder rights in Britain than in the US.  The larger number of defined benefit – rather than 
defined contribution and money purchase – pension schemes in Britain than in the US may 
reinforce this tendency.  Fourthly, UK institutional investors have a much higher proportion of 
their investments in equities than US institutional investors.  Fifthly, the US restrictions on 
banking activities, especially inter-state banking, have no equivalent in Britain (Roe, 1994).  The 
US’s federal constitution, with its protection of State level interests, and deep anti-trust feelings, 
equally have no British equivalents.  Finally, British legislation on anti-takeover defence is less 
elaborated than US legislation.  The inhibitions on investors’ engagement are therefore generally 
less in Britain than in the US. 
 
There are also differences in corporate governance arrangements.  The most important 
differences relate to the role of the CEO.  The role of the CEO in the corporation remains more 
dominant in the US than in Britain, despite the reaction against ‘charismatic’ CEOs evident in 
CEO recruitment in 2002-3, following ENRON and other corporate scandals.  The continuing 
US practice of combining the roles of CEO and chairman of the Board contrasts with the British 
expectation (if not quite requirement) that the two roles should be separated.  Moreover, norms 
regarding levels of senior management remuneration and stock option arrangements appear to be 
more restrictive in Britain than in the US. 
 
Germany - a co-ordinated market economy 
Germany’s economy is categorised as a co-ordinated market economy, along with countries such 
as France, Sweden and sometimes Japan. The relationship between investors and corporate 
management in Germany is very different from the relationship between them in Britain and the 
US.  The influence of investors is less, the influence of managers greater.  The German financial 
management regime may be characterised as ‘insider’ rather than ‘outsider’, without the strict 
separation between ‘owners’ and ‘managers’ characteristic of Britain and the US.  Representatives 
of capital-providers, primarily banks, belong to corporate supervisory boards.  There is a strong 
emphasis on special relationships between investors and managers, especially between firms and 
the corporate ‘hausbank’, most fully developed in the role of regional savings banks in regional 
medium sized firms (Lütz, 2000: 9-10).  Managers’ concerns are with the broadly defined needs 
of the company, including its public interest responsibilities, rather than exclusively with the 
firm’s competitive market performance (Streeck, 2001).  Historically, German firms have 
followed ‘stakeholder’ rather than ‘shareholder’ strategies.  Investor monitoring of performance is 
not based solely on publicly available information, but on specific banking knowledge and 
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reputation: unlike in Williamsonian theory, in this context asymmetric knowledge has not been 
regarded as a systemic weakness.  In Germany the bank prevails over the stock exchange (Albert, 
1997).  Relations between firms in the same industry are collaborative, for example over training 
and standard setting, as well as competitive.  The industrial relations system is inclusive and 
organisationally oriented, through co-determination, and rule-based rather than individualised 
and market mediated.  The education system involves close linkage between general and in-
company training and skills development, whilst employment security encourages sunk costs in 
firm specific training.   
 
The role of financial markets is very different in Germany from the US.  The level of 
capitalisation is lower than in the US, lower even than the capitalisation of the smaller UK 
economy.  Stock market capitalisation was 27 per cent of GDP in 1996 (when the UK level was 
152 per cent), and peaked at 70 per cent in 2000 (when the UK capitalisation was 170 per cent); 
by 2003 it had fallen again to 30 per cent (Vitols, 2004: 4, 13).  Capitalisation increased during the 
dot.com bubble of the late 1990s, before collapsing in 2000.  A lower proportion of German 
firms are listed on the German stock exchange than UK firms on the London stock exchange.  
In January 2004 only 973 German companies were listed on German exchanges (Siebert, 2004).  
Private individual (and foundation) ownership is greater than in Britain, with major firms such as 
Bosch under close control.  Moreover, corporate ownership is more concentrated in Germany 
than in the US or Britain; the mean percentage of shares owned by the five largest shareholders 
was 41.5 per cent in Germany, compared with 25.4 per cent in the US (Ehrentreich and Schmidt, 
1999: 14).  Most importantly, the banks play a much more central role in financing firms than 
British banks.  German banks hold equity stakes and debt claims in the same company.  Banks 
are themselves major shareholders.  In 1999, banks held 13.5 per cent of shares, an increase from 
10.3 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s (Siebert, 2004: 32); in 1998, the Deutsche Bank alone 
held 10.3 per cent of all German shares (Jurgens and Rupp, 2001: 6).  Their influence as 
shareholders is reinforced by their role as proxy voters for private shareholders: banks controlled 
95 per cent of voting rights in Siemens, Hoechst and Mannesmann, and over 90 per cent in Bayer, 
in 1992 (Jurgens and Rupp, 2001:6).  Banks are the major external source of funds for German 
companies; in 2001 bank loans represented 95.54 per cent of corporate credit, compared with 
62.96 per cent in Britain and 44.57 per cent in the US (Siebert, 2004: 29).  Banks are represented 
on corporate supervisory boards; 6.3 per cent of board seats in the largest German companies 
were held by private banks in 1993, although this was significantly lower than the level in the 
1970s (Lütz, 2000: 18).  There are also extensive mutual cross shareholdings, forming a barrier 
against external competition for corporate control; cross shareholding reinforces interlocking 
directorates through representation on supervisory boards (Jurgens and Rupp, 2001: 7). 
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 Germany’s system of managed capitalism has been ultimately based on an implicit social contract, 
in which enterprise management secured the freedom to pursue its interpretation of corporate 
objectives in exchange for accepting stakeholder representation through co-determination 
institutions and providing employment security.  Managerial authority has been sustained by the 
support of large shareholders, including banks and other corporations, partially insulated from 
market forces.  Insulation from the capital market has been achieved by using internally generated 
funds and ‘relational financing’ with banks.  The advantage of this form of managed capitalism 
has been that it combined stability with social balance.  “Risks are internalised through collective 
self-help, corporate decisions are controlled by an insider network, losers in the structural 
processes of modernisation are compensated.  However, a considerable disadvantage of the 
model is that the game plan of co-operation is devised by the insiders and remains obscure for 
outsiders, including small shareholders” (Lütz, 2000: 11).  More generally, the model rested 
upon strong political consensus and relative market stability. 
 
As discussed above in section 4.4, co-ordinated market economies are seen to favour 
incremental process innovation, whilst liberal market economies are seen to favour radical 
product innovation. Ehrentreich and Schmidt conclude that “the German system should 
provide a better long-term oriented environment to the management [of innovation]” than 
the UK or US (1999: 23).  This assessment rests on the priority given to the long-term 
requirements of the company and the importance of commitment not liquidity, echoing a 
long tradition of comparative research (Dore, 2000).  In particular, the structure of 
ownership and corporate governance arrangements foster incremental innovation based upon 
developing employees with industry and firm-specific skills.  The inclusiveness of German 
institutions fosters the productionist approach amongst middle sized firms that gave 
dominance to German firms in sectors such as machine tools, printing press and food 
machinery manufacture.  More generally, the inclusive approach encourages acceptance of 
flexibility, both in work organization and employment conditions – what Ronald Dore (1988) 
termed ‘flexible rigidities’.  The German pattern of corporate control, the forms of enterprise 
governance and the employment relations system support a productionist orientation 
appropriate for sectors in which the rents from innovation are difficult to appropriate (or 
even apportion) and are firm-specific. The process innovations themselves often invisible to 
outsiders.  The German system is appropriate to innovation in engineering or machine tools, 
with skilled employees making incremental improvements to production processes, and close 
co-operation between technology suppliers and their customers (for example in food 
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processing machinery).  It is less appropriate to software development, where innovation is a 
competitive not collaborative process. 
 
With regard to Venture Capital specifically, German funds failed to stimulate the 
development of an Entrepreneurial Business Model through the Frankfurt stock exchange’s 
attempt to create a German equivalent to the US NASDAQ, the Neuer Markt (NM), in 1997. 
Table 7.1 cross-tabulates Venture Capital involvement with industry grouping in the IT 
sector. 
 
Table 7.1: Cross-Tabulation of Four Industry Groups on Different Indicators of Venture 
Capital Involvement 
 General Software 
and Services 
N=30 
% 
Business 
Software 
N=29 
% 
Specialised 
Software 
N=19 
% 
Internet 
Software 
N=27 
% 
VC investment present 23 13 52 37 
VC has member on company 
board 
10 10 15 18 
Early Stage or expansion 6 3 21 22 
Average % of shares held by 
VC at IPO 
7.2 3.1 7.3 9.7 
(From Engelhardt, 2004: 19). 
 
VC investment is more likely in the most sophisticated sub-sectors of software development.  
However, the performance of the more sophisticated internet software companies in terms of 
growth in sales and productivity was below that of companies in general software and services. 
 
The traditional German ‘insider’ system has been threatened in the early twenty-first century, 
with pressure for the adoption of a more ‘Anglo-Saxon’ approach, with its focus on shareholder 
value.  At the most general level, the German government’s wish to develop German finance 
capital, and belief that the lower rate of economic growth in Germany than in the US, or even the 
UK, in the 1990s led to policies designed to bring about a more Anglo-Saxon approach.  More 
specifically, there were five pressures leading to increased emphasis on shareholder value in the 
late 1990s, which have continued to the present.  The first influence was the German 
government’s political initiative to stimulate financial markets, from the early 1990s: 1994 Second 
Law on Promotion of the German Financial Market; 1998 Third Law, Control and Transparency 
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Act; KapAEG, 1998, allowing German companies to issue financial statements on the basis of 
IAS or US-GAAP instead of the German commercial code; overall, seven major pieces of 
legislation were passed in the 1990’s designed to promote, and regulate, financial markets (Lütz, 
2000: 20).  Second, the financial problems of the German welfare state, especially the increasing 
costs of pension provision, required expansion in the funds available to support pensions 
payments.  Third, the growth in mergers and acquisitions, both by German companies and 
internationally, including the Hoechst / Rhone-Poulenc to form Aventis, increased pressure for a 
shareholder value focus.  Fourth, managers of investment and pension funds, especially from the 
US, sought increased returns on investment.  Fifth, international investors, and the European 
Commission, supported standardised corporate governance measures, including disclosure 
provisions.  Overall, the internationalisation of finance encouraged international standardisation 
of investor-investee relations and corporate governance arrangements. 
 
The German system is undoubtedly developing in the direction of greater influence for investors, 
with increased attention by managers to investor relations.  By 2000 110 companies had joined 
the Deutscher Investor Relations Kreis e.V. (Dirk), an association for exchanging experiences in 
managing investor relations, established in 1990.  Sensitivity to share price changes has increased, 
with corporate reorganisations following share price decline, as at Bayer (see the case study on 
Bayer investor relations, published separately).  Inter-firm linkages are weakening, with a decline 
in inter-locking directorates, accelerated by the abolition of the tax on corporate share sales in 
2002.  Share options are being introduced to provide additional incentives for senior managers, if 
on a smaller scale than in Britain and the US, and without the surrounding rhetoric of alignment 
with shareholder value.  There is increased German exposure to US influences, with the rise in 
investment flows in both directions, greater involvement by German managers in US style 
management education, with its finance emphasis, and major German-US mergers such as 
Daimler-Benz-Chrysler.  Major German companies such as Bayer have followed Daimler-Benz’s 
1993 example and listed on the New York Stock Exchange, financial practices being required to 
meet the increasingly stringent NYSE listing requirements.  Large German enterprises are 
increasingly incorporated into international financial flows, whilst small and medium sized 
enterprises remain tied to German banks.  Reflecting this trend, major German companies have 
adopted International Accounting Standards, significantly different from the traditional German 
Commercial Code, for example in the treatment of hedging fund arrangements. 
 
The direction of changes in the German system, towards greater priority for shareholder interests, 
is evident.  However, the extent and speed of the change, and its precise significance for investor-
management relations, is not clear.  According to one view, the changes in German financial 
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arrangements are limited, because the institutions of corporate governance are embedded in 
broader economic arrangements that have not changed.  The role of equity capital in funding 
capital investment remains lower than in the UK or US; the significance of private pension funds 
remains limited, with state pensions providing more generous benefits; the banks retain a central 
role; and labour retains influence both at national political level and at the level of the enterprise 
through co-determination arrangements.  Analysis of changes at the firm level shows the 
conflicting tendencies. 
 
However, some of the indicators of German convergence towards US-style relations between 
investors and corporate management proved misleading.  The growth in the venture capital 
market proved temporary, associated with the dot.com bubble of the late 1990s, rather than 
permanent.  Between 1997 and 2003 over 300 German firms were launched through the 
Frankfurt Neuer Markt, 179 with venture capital backing (Tykova, 2003: 19).  But after rapid 
expansion in the second half of 1999 and the first half of 2000 the market’s issuing activities 
almost completely stopped in 2001, with only one firm going public between August 2001 and 
December 2002.  The Neuer Markt closed in June 2003; the growth in IPOs collapsed.  Although 
the proportion of foreign share ownership increased throughout the 1990s, from 12.1 per cent of 
shares at the beginning of the decade to 18.5 per cent at the end (Siebert, 2004: 32), the 
Vodaphone takeover of Mannesmann was not followed by a flurry of further foreign takeovers 
of major German companies.  The two-tier system of Supervisory Boards and Boards of 
Management, enshrining co-determination principles and the interests of employees, survives.  
Internally generated funds and bank credit remain the major sources of funds for new investment.  
Although major German companies are increasingly international in their operations, they remain 
embedded in their national or even local economic systems.  Even the most ‘shareholder friendly’ 
major German corporation, Bayer, has no international members of either its Supervisory or 
Management Board, despite having 85 per cent of its sales in 2003 outside Germany’ (Höpner, 
2001; Bayer, 2004).  Even the Deutsche Bank has only one non-German member on its twenty-
person Supervisory Board (Sir Peter Job, appointed 2001), despite its internationalising strategies.  
Bayer has retained its headquarters in Leverkusen, not moving to Frankfurt much less the US. 
 
The historic German stakeholder model is being modified, with the incorporation of ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ elements.  However, Germany is moving towards an augmented stakeholder coalition, 
rather than towards a liberal market economy shareholder value model (Vitols, 2003: 19).  The 
balance of interests amongst stakeholders is changing, with enhanced weight accorded to 
shareholder interests.  Indications of this trend include increased transparency in the presentation 
of annual accounts, increased protection for the interests of minority shareholders and, for major 
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global corporations, changes in corporate governance to meet the requirements of NYSE listing.  
International, primarily US, capital investment, reinforced by European Union pressure, is 
requiring evolution towards international norms of good corporate governance.  Government 
policies seek to enhance, or at least protect, shareholders’ interests. The result of such pressures 
may be to create a sharper division between major internationally oriented corporations, 
operating increasingly according to an international Anglo-Saxon model, with its emphasis on 
shareholder value, and medium and small enterprises, operating according to traditional values, 
reliant for external capital upon German banks, especially the Lander based savings banks, with 
their regional public interest obligations.  The first group may see a gradual change in relations 
between investors and management, with investors, especially international investors, exercising 
increasing influence.  Medium and small firms may continue to operate in international product 
markets, without reorganising their corporate governance arrangements.  
 
Some recent trends have strengthened the position of managers rather than shareholders.  For 
example, the reduction in the number of bank representatives on Supervisory Boards has led to 
an increase in the number of former company managers on Supervisory Boards, including in the 
position of chairman.  Employees remain acknowledged – legally, politically, and in corporate 
practice – as a legitimate primary interest, protected under co-determination legislation.  
Proposals in November 2004 by employers’ organisations (the BDA and the BDI) to radically 
revise co-determination arrangements have been resisted by firm level managers, as well as by 
trade unions (Financial Times, 11/11/04).  The attitude of trade unions and employees’ 
representatives on Supervisory Boards towards changes is ambivalent.  On the one hand, the 
traditional stakeholder model has preserved employment security and high earnings (if also with 
high taxes).  On the other hand, the Commercial Code required only loose monitoring of 
management, undermining trust during the industrial disputes of the early 1990s, and rising 
unemployment weakened union commitment to traditional institutions.  The Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), usually supported by the trade unions, took the initiative in reforming corporate 
governance, not the conservative Christian Democrat Union (CDU): the SPD and trade unions 
saw shareholders as a potentially liberalising influence, weakening the power of banks and 
corporate networks (Höpner, 2003: 22).  Such liberalisation would weaken the CDU, as well as 
making Germany more attractive for foreign direct investment. 
 
What will the effects of the development of augmented stakeholder capitalism be upon skills 
development and innovation?  Traditional German stakeholder institutions fostered the 
development of general skills, within a framework of employment security and internal, rule 
governed, promotion hierarchies.  The growth of shareholder value and increasing market 
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mechanisms may reduce the incentives for firms to provide, and for employees to undertake, 
company level skills development.  The incentives will diminish especially if employment security 
is undermined.  However, increasing shareholder value orientation within the framework of co-
determination reduces the likelihood that shareholder value will be introduced at the expense of 
job security.  Reductions in employment levels are being  achieved through generous early 
retirement packages, without the use of compulsory redundancy; in effect, the cost of 
employment adjustment has been largely borne by the state.  Moreover, more generally, the 
philosophy of investor engagement identified in this literature review is consistent with the long-
standing overlapping roles of owners and managers characteristic of traditional German 
arrangements.  The incentives for firms to provide in-company skills development will continue, 
as will the incentives for employees to invest intellectual capital in acquiring company-specific 
skills. 
 
Are changes in investor-management relations necessary to increase the flexibility of German 
firms, increasing the ability to respond to changing product markets?  Concentrated share 
ownership, inter-company shareholding arrangements, slack bank monitoring and an internal 
focus encouraged by co-determination institutions, may be expected to reduce corporate 
flexibility.  Strategies designed to protect insider interests retard the process of creative 
destruction that Schumpeter saw as essential for entrepreneurial innovation (Schumpeter, 1950).  
However, the German pattern of investor-manager relations did not prevent the restructuring of 
German firms associated with multi-divisionalisation in the 1980s and early 1990s (although state 
shareholding did stifle change) (Whittington and Mayer, 2000: 196-201).  Similarly, the creation of 
decentralised profit centres, the reduction in cross subsidies within multi-divisional firms, and the 
de-merger of loss making divisions, are being carried through without major changes in relations 
between investors and managers.  In short, changes in the basic structure of relations between 
investors and managers were slower to occur than changes in management practice. In other 
words, there remain substantial differences between the UK and Germany with regard to 
investor-management relations. Big institutional investors (banks) have more opportunity to 
influence management practice in Germany through ‘relational financing’, including 
representation on corporate supervisory boards. However, although there are moves towards 
greater influence for all shareholders, their interests are just those of one set of stakeholders, and 
all stakeholders’ interests are taken into account in the decision-making process. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The past several decades have witnessed a trend towards the institutionalization of the savings 
process; more than half of all stocks outstanding are held through institutions rather than direct 
holdings of securities by individuals. The increased popularity of pension funds since World War 
II and the more recent development and expansion of Keogh plans (pensions for people in small 
businesses) and IRA (Individual Retirement Accounts, for people not participating in pension 
schemes at work) accounts have resulted in the delegation of a large degree of corporate control 
to the managers of financial institutions. Prior to the 1980s such institutional investors were 
relatively passive and tended to vote shares in accordance with management's wishes. However, 
as the holdings of institutional investors increased, so did the pressure to produce attractive 
returns. In an attempt to improve performance, institutional funds and other investors have 
become much more active in monitoring management and enforcing change through 
engagement. 
 
Drivers for the adoption of engagement in Britain as well as in the US also include a general 
industry-wide concern for investor returns, organisational design innovations in the engagement 
practice, demand for more detailed information on companies (for screening), and application of 
existing corporate management expertise. External pressures from stakeholder groups or the 
`professional stakeholder community' may also be relevant. The relevance of US engagement 
practice has been questioned in Britain, because it involves a higher degree of formal shareholder 
intervention, for example through shareholder resolutions.  However, in practice negotiated 
settlements and dialogue dominate in both countries.  
 
Within this context, a substantial academic and popular literature argues that the performance of 
British corporations might improve if British corporations had long-term outside investors who 
would hold large stakes, actively monitor management performance, and engage with 
management in setting corporate policy. The American and British prototypes are Warren 
Buffett’s holding company, Berkshire Hathaway, and Hermes, respectively. The German and 
Japanese prototype is the lead bank that both lends to a company and owns a large block of its 
shares. Large investors, which hold sizable, relatively illiquid stakes in their portfolio companies, 
could, in theory, play this role in the UK. The performance of the activist investors in general 
suggests that as an investment strategy engagement can work remarkably well. This is also 
apparent from the dramatic growth and success of the private equity market since the early 1990s. 
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Not all financial institutions or other types of investors are likely to engage with company 
managers. Public pension funds and private equity finance have the highest propensity for 
engagement. The likelihood of engagement is determined by a number of factors such as fund 
size, investment time horizon, performance expectations, the proportion invested in equity, legal 
restraints, active/passive investing and internal/external management. 
 
Several coordination norms in engagement practice appear to be emerging spontaneously 
through imitation and collaborative association. This is establishing a dominant architecture for 
effective engagement.  The business case is at the heart of engagement practices, including the 
process for identifying targets, engaging with a large proportion of investees, feeding engagement 
into the investment processes; and reporting to clients. When the theoretical case for engagement 
is strong, for example when there is a clear case for engagement to enhance performance, issues 
are taken on board, and once engagement is completed the fund exits. 
 
The present study developed a conceptual framework to evaluate the relationship between 
finance and management practices. Results indicate that investors may potentially influence a 
number of management practice areas. Of these, time horizon appears to be the most critical area 
of influence (patient capital mitigating any management short-termism), followed by 
management's strategic focus, innovation and product development, long-term investment in 
intangibles, performance expectation, corporate leadership, and venture capital firms’ strategies 
for creating value. Further case study research will establish the exact nature and scope of such 
interrelationships. It will also indicate the importance on management and leadership and skills 
development. 
 
Data on publicly-traded UK firms were used to investigate whether financing choices differ 
systematically with R&D intensity. The analysis shows that R&D firms are more likely to 
raise funds by issuing shares than firms that report no R&D, and this probability increases 
with R&D intensity. 
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